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WHAT THE SUPREME COURT DID NOT DO
DURING THE 1950 TERM
By FOWLER V. HARPER t AND EDWIN D. ETHERINGTON
This article is an encore to last year's survey of the denials of
certiorari over the preceding term-not so much because of the applause,
but because it is thought that the by-product of the Court's work may be
as significant for the national interest as the "work" itself. It is, of
course, misleading to contrast the 114 cases "decided" by the Court,
with the more than 1000 cases which it refused to decide. If an
efficiency expert took a look at the business of our highest tribunal, he
might very well come away with the notion that more time is devoted
to deciding not to decide a case than to the disposition of those which
get from one to four or five opinions from the Justices. But it is also
true that the Court's effect on national policy cannot accurately be ap-
praised without prying into that portion of its work which is buried in
a statistic of the office of the Administrator.
In last year's feeble effort to penetrate the purple curtain of cer-
tiorari it was emphasized how difficult it was to get at the facts with
regard to the cases checked up on the Miscellaneous Dockets. Most of
these are in forma pauperis, with but one home-made petition, often in
long-hand. There is no way for an investigator to discover anything
about such cases except to go to the Supreme Court, building to study
the originals. Once in a while, such a case can be discovered by accident
or because of newspaper publicity or some other equally fortuitous cir-
cumstance, as for example, recognition of the name of a well known
warden. For the most part, however, under present Court practices
and records, as a practical matter, most of these cases can never be
brought to light. As a matter of fact, except in rare instances, there is
no compelling reason why they should be brought to light because they
have no conceivable merit.
The Appeals Docket is another matter. A good bit can be learned
about the cases so listed by the simple device of reading the decisions
in the lower courts. But this, in itself a task of considerable magnitude,
does not tell the entire story. To understand the total situation would
require the same study of the records and briefs which the Justices and
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their staff have made. Even such a study would often fail to record
just why the Court refused to review the case other than that four
Justices failed so to vote, and we know that before we start.
Indeed, that is about the only thing we do know about denial of
certiorari. There are many reasons why the writ may be denied and
it is seldom that any is given. Once in a while, as in the Agoston case 1
during the 1950 term, a hint as to the basis for the action is given, but
ninety-nine out of a hundred cases are left to pure speculation. The
Federal Rules set forth the formal reasons for granting certiorari. But
neither the Rules nor the decisions reveal the reasons for adverse action.
Not only are we not told why certiorari is denied, but it is the
exceptional case in which we know how many Justices, if any, less than
four, favored review. Occasionally, a Justice will "note" his dissent
but even when he does, he will not say why. During the past term there
were actually 292 cases in which there were dissents. The fraction
case was Dennis,' in a dissenting opinion to which Mr. Justice Black
made the unusual revelation that he had dissented from the limitation
imposed by the majority on the scope of review. Presumably he was
prepared to consider more of the many problems involved than the con-
stitutionality of the Smith Act. When one considers the enormous
importance of the case, his position is not hard to understand.
In the 1949 term, Mr. Justice Frankfurter wrote a thirteen page
opinion in connection with a denial of certiorari to reiterate the oft-
repeated admonition that the bar can make no inferences as to the merits
of a case merely because the Court declines to review it.' He followed
up with another warning during the past term.4 The Court is not
deciding a case one way or the other. This, of course, is technically
true, but the guess might be ventured that not one person in a hundred
thousand realizes it. Indeed, a lot of people who ought to know better.
assume the contrary.' When the Court denied certiorari in the Hiss
case, there was a wide-spread understanding that the denial was tanta-
mount to affirmance,' and so far as Hiss was concerned, of course, it
1. Agoston v. Pennsylvania, 364 Pa. 464, 72 A.2d 575, cert. denied, 340 U.S. 844
(1950), discussed infra note 91 and text.
2. Dennis v. United States, 183 F.2d 201 (2d Cir. 1950), aff'd, 341 U.S. 494
(1951).
3. Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, 67 A.2d 497 (Md. 1949), cert. denied
338 U.S. 912 (1950).
4. See Agoston v. Pennsylvania, supra note 1, in which he said: "The denial of
the petition seeking to bring here the decision of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
carries with it no support of the decision in that case, nor of any of the views in the
opinion supporting it." 340 U.S. at 845.
5. "It is not merely the laity" who regard a denial of certiorari as support for
the decision in the lower court. See Justice Frankfurter in Agoston v. Pennsylvania,
Id. at 844.
6. United States v. Hiss, 185 F.2d 822 (2d Cir. 1950), 340 U.S. 948 (1951). In
Bert Andrews' story in the Herald-Tribune of March 12, 1950, after the 'denial of
certiorari in the Hiss case, Senator Nixon, a lawyer, was quoted as saying; "This
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was true. Actually the case presented little more than the mystery of a
missing typewriter and one man's word against another under circum-
stances where it was pretty obvious that one of them was lying. It is
hardly a plausible proposition that the Supreme Court should review a
jury's findings as to the credibility of witnesses. Actually, if the Court
had reviewed Hiss, it is incredible that anything other than an affirm-
ance would have resulted. But that is beside the point so far as an
understanding of the Court's action is concerned.
From the outside, with no chance to look in, there will be many
cases which appear important in the sense that a reasonable lawyer
might think a review by the Court is indicated, but which may have a
perfectly valid disposition. Many times it is impossible to hazard a safe
guess as to the basis for the Court's action. Others will disclose a straw
in the wind. Take, for example, a diversity case, involving an action
for wrongful death.
An airplane disaster in Utah presented the simple facts and com-
plicated legal problem as follows :' Petitioner's testator was killed in the
crash of respondent's DC-6 airliner in Utah. Suit was brought in a
Federal District Court of Illinois under the Utah death statute against
respondent, a Delaware corporation. One of the defenses presented was
the Illinois Injuries Act which provides that "no action shall be brought
or prosecuted in this State to recover damages for a death occurring out-
side of this State where a right of action for such death exists under the
laws of the place where such death occurred and service of process in
such suit may be had upon the defendant in such place." 8 The defense
was held valid as against a motion to strike and a petition for certiorari
was sought before judgment in the court of appeals.9
decision by the highest court of the land, should resolve any lingering doubt which
may have existed as to the guilt of Alger Hiss." Why should this decision resolve
anything unless it was on the merits? We are told, however, that the only thing
it resolves is that for some reason or another which will never be known, less than
four justices voted to review it.
Again in a letter written to the editor of the Herald-Tribune praising the work
of Andrews in bringing about the Hiss prosecution and conviction, Senator Nixon
began by saying: "Now that the Supreme Court has finally written the decision in the
case of Alger Hiss, I should like to take this opoprtunity to give due credit. . '."
Even the Justices themselves slip up occasionally: "We may have been right or
we may have been wrong in these repeated denials of review. But what the Court
of Appeals has now done is to try to effectuate a judgment that we, by refusal to
review, in effect have confirmed." (Emphasis supplied). Justice Jackson in Sawyer
v. Dollar, 341 U.S. 737, 748 (1951). To be sure, the Justice carefully used the word
"confirmed" instead of "affirmed", but the distinction may not be noticed even by many
lawyers.
7. First National Bank of Chicago v. United Air Lines, Inc., 190 F. 2d 493, cert.
denied, 341 U.S. 903 (1951).
8. Ill. Laws 1949, §'1, IaL. STAT. ANN., c. 70, §2 (Smith-Hurd, Supp. 1950).
9. 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) (Supp. 1950) ; Rxv. RuLxs Sup. CT. 39.
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The case was regarded as raising the principle involved in the con-
fused and highly controversial case of Angel v. Bullington 1o which, it
has been predicted, will plague the bar and the Court for a long time to
come. 1 May the legislatures of the states circumscribe the limits of the
jurisdiction of the federal courts in diversity cases? The federal district
court in the United Air Lines case found: "(a) The Illinois statute
deprives a Federal District Court in Illinois of jurisdiction to entertain
a suit for a wrongful death occurring in Utah; * * * (c) Said statute
does not violate the full faith and credit clause of the Federal Constitu-
tion." Erie v. Tompkins ' was intended to make effective a policy of
one law for the States, without regard to whether action was brought
in a state or federal court. To be sure procedure was not affected; that
is, the federal rules were to prevail in federal courts while the state
rules would naturally govern procedure in the state courts. This made
the distinction between "substance" and "procedure" vital for the ap-
plication of the rule of Erie v. Tompkins. But what of the question of
jurisdiction? It is not easy to regard jurisdiction-the power to hear
and determine-as a question either of substance or procedure. The
usual dichotomy seems inadequate here. The problem was glossed over
in Angel v. Bullington and of course no further light is shed on the
subject by the refusal of the Court to consider it in the. instant case.
Angel v. Bullington was decided by a divided Court and none of the
opinions was satisfactory and none of them put in proper focus the real
issues involved.
The district court in United Air Lines followed two court of ap-
peals decisions '3 which held that the Illinois statute was a jurisdictional
bar in the federal courts. These holdings were thought to be required
by Angel v. Bullington and Woods v. Interstate Realty Co.' Peti-
tioner in United Air Lines sought to explain Angel as merely adopting
state policy, expressed by statute, as a defense or substantive bar to a
cause of action created by another state reflecting a contrary policy, 15
a theory which would make some sense.
Petitioner further argued that the Illinois statute was void as
offending the full faith and credit clause rule. While petitioner's case
was pending, there was also pending before the Court for full review
10. 330 U.S. 183 (1947).
11. See the criticism of this case by Harper, Mr. Justice Rutledge and Full
Faith and Credit, 25 IND. L.J. 480, 490 (1949-1950).
12. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
13. Trust Co. of Chicago v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 183 F.2d 640 (7th Cir.
1950) ; Munch v. United Air Lines, Inc. 184 F.2d 630 (7th Cir. 1950), the latter case
involving the same accident as that in which decedent of the instant case was killed.
14. 337 U.S. 535 (1949).
15. Brief for Petitioner, p. 17, First National Bank of Chicago v. United Air
Lines, 341 U.S. 903 (1951).
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the case of Hughes v. Fetter '" from Wisconsin. Here, the decedent
had been killed in Illinois and action for wrongful death was brought
in Wisconsin. There was a Wisconsin statute 17 which the supreme
court of that state had interpreted as effecting the same result as the
Illinois statute, viz., that the action under a foreign wrongful death
act could not be maintained in Wisconsin, on the theory that the public
policy of the state forbade such suit.1 The Court heard the case and,
on the last day of the term, reversed; holding by a five to four decision
that the full faith and credit clause rule required Wisconsin to allow
the action under the Illinois death statute.
Here is obviously a snarled situation. To be sure, there are
differences between these cases and Angel. But are they significant?
The Court 'of Appeals for the 7th Circuit thought not. The crazy-quilt
combination of Erie and res judicata of Angel " is the source of the
trouble. Neither the majority opinion nor the dissent written by
Justice Frankfurter in Hughes throws light on the confusion created
by the majority opinion in Angel, written by Justice Frankfurter.'
As to the question of the denial of certiorari in United Air Lines
and the review and reversal in Hughes of the identical issue, there may
be a valid explanation. In United Air Lines, petitioner sought to by-
pass the court of appeals and obtain an immediate review by the
Supreme Court at a time when the Hughes case was already pending."0
Even after the denial of certiorari, presumably petitioner will obtain
a review in the court of appeals, the court taking into account the de-
cision in the Hughes case. If this is a correct analysis of the situation,
it would have required but a few sentences to explain the denial of
16. 257 Wis. 35, 42 N.W.2d 452, reversed, 341 U.S. 609 (1951); commented
upon, 100 U. oF PA. L. REv. 126 (1951).
17. Wis. STAT. § 331.03 (1947).
18. Hughes v. Fetter, 257 Wis. 35, 42 N.W.2d 452 (1950).
19. Rutledge, J., dissenting, Angel v. Bullington, 330 U.S. 183, 201 (1947).
20. In his Brief, p. 6, petitioner stated: "The writ is sought here before judgment
or decision of the Court of Appeals. The reason is apparent. Two substantial con-
stitutional questions are involved. The first has been adversely determined by the
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Trust Company of Chicago v. Pennsyl-
vania R. Co., 183 Fed. (2) 640, (July 1950), and Munch v. United Airlines, Inc., 184
Fed. (2) 630 (Nov. 1950). These holdings were thought to be compelled by the de-
cisions of this Court. For this reason it would be a useless gesture for Petitioners
to ask that Court to reconsider, absent further expression by this Court. The second
of these questions [Full Faith and Credit] (not raised before the Court of Appeals in
the two cases above) is already before this Court, viewed from a different aspect,
in Hughes, Adm. v. Fetter, -Docket 355, this Term."
Petitions for certiorari may issue to the Courts of Appeal before judgment when
there are questions of pressing public interest which require prompt Supreme Court
review. REv. RUtEs Sup. CT. 39 ROBERTSON AND KIRKHAM, JURISDICTIONS OF THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITa STATES §§ 131, 410 (Wolfson & Curland 1951). It
is necessary that notice of appeal be filed, but whether the record must also be filed
is not altogether clear. Cf. Rule 73 (a) and STERN AND GRESSMAN, SUPREME
COURT PRAcTIcE, §13 (1950).
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certiorari by the Supreme Court, surely not a prohibitive demand on
the Court's time. Justice Frankfurter, however, is one of the most
vociferous defenders of the Court in its refusal to give reasons for its
denial of certiorari.
AN OVER-ALL VIEW OF WHAT THE COURT DM AND Dw NOT Do
For the 1950 term, there were 1,335 cases on the dockets as
compared to 1,448 for the 1949 term. The 1950 figure includes 13
cases on the Original Dockets, 783 on the Appellate and 539 on the
Miscellaneous Dockets. In its efforts to clear these dockets, the Court
wrote 91 opinions, four more than last year, taking care of 114 cases.
In addition, 77 cases, all but three from the Appellate Dockets, were
disposed of by per curiam orders or opinions. Four more cases were
disposed of on the merits either on motion to dismiss or per stipu-
lation of the parties. Thus 195 cases out of 1,335 were disposed of
on the merits, 14.6 per cent as contrasted with 15.4 per cent during the
1949 term.
The Court declined to review 495 cases on the Appellate Dockets
and 386 on the Miscellaneous Dockets. Furthermore, there were 121
applications for other relief, such as habeas corpus or mandamus, de-
nied or withdrawn from the Miscellaneous Dockets. Thus 1,002 cases
were simply listed as denied review or application withdrawn. These
figures, however, are too charitable; they do not constitute an ac-
curate guide to what the Court actually chose not to do. In addition
to the 1,002 cases, the Court disposed of 65 cases by per curiam order
without hearing argument on the merits and dismissed four others,
as mentioned above, on motion or per stipulation of the parties. The
more reliable figure, therefore, is 1,071 out of 1,216, with 119 cases
carried over to next term.
Of the 74 appeals filed, the Court noted probable jurisdiction or
postponed that question to a hearing on the merits in 28. In 32 cases
the appeal was dismissed; in another it was dismissed in part and
affirmed in part. In 11 others, the Court affirmed or reversed without
hearing argument on the merits. In one case, the judgment was re-
versed per curiam after argument and in another the appeal was dis-
missed but certiorari was later granted.
The Court's 77 per curiam orders covered 46 appeal cases, all
but two of which, as noted above, were disposed of without argument
on the merits. The 31 orders which covered certiorari petitions in-
clude 21 in which the Court reversed, remanded, dismissed on motion,
or denied certiorari without first hearing argument on the merits.
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Thus of the 77 cases disposed of through per curiam orders--com-
monly thought, perhaps, to represent decisions going to the heart of
the controversies-65 were disposed of (some, undoubtedly, for good
reason) without hearing argument on the merits. The Court actually
heard argument in only 11.7% of the cases before it, whereas it dis-
posed of 14.6% by opinions or orders, as opposed to flat denials of
review.
Following is a statistical summary of the 1950 term which gives
a general view of how the Court performed its high functions.
1. Disposition of Cases by Dockets
I. Appellate Dockets
Total Cases .................................... 783
Cases Disposed of:
By ninety-one written opinions .................. 114
By per curiam opinions or orders ................. 74
By motion to dismiss or per stipulation (merit cases).. 4
By denial or dismissal of petitions for certiorari .... 495
Remaining on Dockets ............................. 96
II. Miscellaneous Dockets
Total Cases ...................................... 539
Cases Disposed of:
By transfer to Appellate Docket .................. 14
By per curiam order or opinion .................. 3
By denial or dismissal of certiorari ................ 386
By denial or withdrawal of other applications ........ 121
Remaining on Dockets ............................. 15
III. Original Dockets
Total Cases ...................................... 13
Cases disposed of ................................. 5
Remaining on Dockets ............................. 8
IV. Total All Dockets
Total Cases ...................................... 1335
Cases Disposed of ................................. 1216
Remaining on Dockets ............................. 119
2. Disposition of Appeals
Total Appeals filed ................................ 74
Jurisdiction noted or postponed to argument on merits ... 28
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Dismissed per curiam .............................. 33
Disposed of by other per curiam orders ............... 13
3. Per Curiam Orders or Opinions
I. Total orders or opinions (including Miscellaneous Dockets) 77
II. Merits actually argued-certiorari cases:
Affirmed after argument ........................ 5
Reversed after argument ........................ 2
Certiorari granted, continued to next term ......... 2
Motion for reconsideration continued .............. 1
Merits actually argued-Appeal cases:
Reversed after argument ........................ 1
Dismissed, but certiorari later granted ............. 1
Total cases in which merits actually argued ............ 12
III. Disposed of without argument-Certiorari cases:
Reversed, remanded, dismissed on motion, or denied in
conjunction with dismissal of an appeal ........ 21
Disposed of without argument-Appeal cases:
Dismissed .................................... 32
Dismissed in part, affirmed in part ................ 1
Affirmed ..................................... 9
Reversed ..................... ................ 2
Total cases in which merits were not argued ........... 65
4. Some Realistic Statistics
I. Cases disposed of after argument as to the merits:
By written opinions ............................ 114
By per curiam opinions or orders ................. 12
Total ........................................ 126
II. Cases disposed of without hearing argument as to merits:
Denied certiorari, Appellate Dockets .............. 495
Dismissed on motion or per stipulation, Appellate
Dockets .................................. 4
Denied certiorari, Miscellaneous Dockets ........... 386
Denied or withdrew other applications, Miscellaneous
D ockets .................................. 121
Disposed by per curiam orders or opinions ......... 65
Total ........................................ 1071
III. Of all cases disposed of, the percentage in which the merits
were actually argued ........................... 10.5%
Of cases disposed of by per curiam order, the percentage in
which the merits were actually argued ............ 15.6%
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5. Some Comparative Statistics
Terms
1949 1950
All cases on the Appellate Dockets ........... 867 783
Disposed of on merits .................. 201 192
Disposed of by denial of certiorari ....... 556 495
Remaining on dockets at term end ....... 110 96
Percentage cases disposed on merits ...... 23% 25%
Percentage cases denied certiorari ....... 64% 64%
Percentage work left un-done ........... 13% 11%
All cases on the Miscellaneous Dockets ........ 568 539
Disposed on the merits ................ 7 17
Disposed of by denial of certiorai ........ 436 386
Disposed of by denial or withdrawal of other
applications ...................... 108 121
Remaining on dockets at term end ....... 17 15
Percentage cases disposed on merits ..... 1.2% 3.1%
Percentage cases denied certiorari ....... 77o 72%
Percentage cases disposed by denial or with-
drawal of other applications ........ 18.9% 22%
Percentage work left un-done ........... 2.9% 2.9%
Review denied, all categories
Certiorari denied, Appellate Dockets ..... 556 495
Certiorari denied, Miscellaneous Dockets.. 436 386
Appeals dismissed .................... 41 33
Total ............................... 1033 914
Percentage review denied, all cases on Ap-
pellate and Miscellaneous Dockets ... 72% 69%
FOOTNOTE ON DISSENTS "NOTED"
The dissents "noted" where certiorari is denied are interesting.
As usual, Justices Douglas and Black were the most frequent dissent
"noters." Professor Frank, who keeps a running score on such mat-
ters, has pointed out that these two Justices are by far the most out-
of-step of all members of the Court, as determined by their agreement
or lack of agreement with the majority in important cases accorded
full review. Professor Frank's calculations indicate Justice Black vot-
ing with the majority in 54% of such cases, Justice Douglas in 48%
as against the Chief Justice's score of 95%, Justice Jackson 89%,
Justice Clark 83%, Justice Reed 82%, Justice Burton 78%, Justice
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Minton 75 %, and Justice Frankfurter 65 %, for whatever such statistics
are worth.
Perhaps they are worth a little more, in an appraisal of the atti-
tudes of the Justices on certain important policy issues, when equated
with the dissents "noted" in certiorari denials. Of 29 cases in which
the dissenting Justice or Justices recorded their disapproval of the
Court's action, Justice Black spoke up in 22, Justice Douglas in 21,
Justice Reed in 4, Justice Burton in 1. The other members of the
Court either agreed that all 914 petitions and appeals should not be
heard or were content to leave the purple curtain impenetrable. Jus-
tices Black and Douglas were companions in "noting'" their dissents
in 13 cases, in 2 of which they were joined by Justice Reed. In the
cases decided by the Court, after hearing and argument, Justices Black
and Douglas were together in dissent in 24 cases, each dissenting in
12 others for a total of 36 apiece.2
Since dissents to denials of certiorari are notations rather than
opinions, it is difficult to make much of a guess as to the reasons for
them. Justice Black's long interest in Indian Affairs can hardly ex-
plain why he wanted to review the decision of the Court of Claims in
United States v. Rogue River Tribe of Indians.22 The case merely
involved the right to and the amount of compensation due certain
tribes for treaty lands, occupied by them before their removal from
their reservation. Whether it was the method of calculating the
amounts due or something else which attracted his interest will prob-
ably never be known. Perhaps it is a good thing that there is one
Justice on the Supreme Court who has not forgotten the most for-
gotten of all Americans.
Moffett v. Arabian American Oil Co.'s involved a fantastic claim
under an alleged contract between the parties wherein the plaintiff was
to undertake to persuade the United States government to require the
British government, as a condition to a loan to the latter, to "take care
of" the budget requirements of the King of Saudi Arabia. The plain-
tiff got a verdict in the trial court for $1,115,000 which was set aside
by the trial judge on two grounds: (1) there was no proof that the
plaintiff performed the services for which he claimed compensation;
(2) the agreement was against public policy. The court of appeals
affirmed in an odd opinion in which Judge Frank said that the court
agreed with the trial judge on the first ground and thus found it un-
21. Total dissenting opinions of all the Justices are: Vinson 6, Clark 9, Reed 12,
Minton 12, Burton 13, Jackson 18, Frankfurter 22, Douglas 36, Black 36.
22. 89 F. Supp. 798 (1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 902 (1951).
23. 184 F.2d 859 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 948 (1950).
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necessary to consider the second. Justice Black "noted" his dissent.
It seems unlikely that Justice Black would seriously consider uphold-
ing so brazen an agreement. It is a good guess, therefore, that he
would review the case, reverse the court of appeals on its first ground
but uphold the judgment on the second, thus establishing what he
would regard as a good precedent rather than a bad one.
Dissents by Justices Black and Douglas in three F.E.L.A. cases 
24
may also be explained by their notions of the respective functions of
judge and jury. All involved the recovery by the injured employee
of a jury verdict and a reversal, in two cases by a state court, in the
other by the United States court of appeals, on grounds of insufficiency
of evidence of negligence, contributory negligence or causal connec-
tion, all being traditionally jury questions. Only Justice Black dis-
sented in a case originating in Oklahoma in which the supreme court
of the state reversed after the plaintiff had recovered in an action for
damages for trespass.2"
Justices Black and Douglas again dissented in Pohl v. Acheson26
which involved petitions for writs of habeas corpus on behalf of seven
German nationals held in American military prisons in Germany await-
ing execution after conviction by United States military tribunals. The
petitions were dismissed by summary judgment, the court of appeals
affirming on the authority of Johnson v. Eisentrager27 and Flick v.
Johnson.28 The petitioners had contended in their efforts to obtain a
review by the Supreme Court that (1) the speed and undue haste with
which the proceedings below were conducted deprived them of any
semblance of due process of law, (2) since a state of war no longer
existed between the United States and Germany, the cases relied upon
by the court of appeals were no longer controlling, (3) the consolida-
tion of the proceedings by the court below was error,29 (4) the court
24. Ottley v. St. Louis-San Francisco R.R. Co., 360 Mo. 1189, 232 S.W.2d 966,
cert. denied, 340 U.S. 948 (1951); Healy v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 184 F.2d 209 (3d
Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 935 (1951) ; Roberts v. Mo-Kans.-Tex. R. Co., 225
S.W.2d 198 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 832 (1951).
25. Rosencrans v. Edmond Salt Water Disposal Assn., 204 Okla. 9, 226 P.2d
965, cert. denied, 340 U.S. 924 (1951). Plaintiff claimed that salt water from an aban-
doned well on adjoining property had percolated into the underground stratum of
salt water and thence into a portion of stratum under plaintiff's land. The evidence,
however, did not show that plaintiff had been deprived of possession, use or enjoyment
of his land or that he had been in any way restricted in its use.
26. 19 U.S.L. WEEK 3272 (1951), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 916 (1951), commented
on in Note, 51 COL. L. REv. 368 (1951) ; 36 CoRx. L.Q. 303 (1951) ; comment, 49
MicH. L. Rav. 870 (1951).
27. 339 U.S. 763, (1950), in which Justices Black and Douglas had dissented.
28. 174 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir.) cert. denied, 338 U.S, 879 (1949), to which Justice
Black noted his dissent.
29. The seven petitions involved four separate trials. Five petitions concerned
two Nurnberg trials and two petitions concerned two Dachau proceedings.
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below erred in failing to appoint counsel to represent petitioners on
filing of their petitions in propria persona. Justice Jackson, of course,
disqualified himself.
On its face, California-Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland
Cement Co.30 would appear to dispose of the petition for certiorari in
Dority v. Bliss."' Both cases seemed to present a claim based on the
common law rights of riparian proprietors alleged to have attached to
the lands when the patent issued to the first predecessor in title. To
Justices Douglas and Reed, however, the similarity was not so obvious
or they thought the precedent should be reexamined. Whatever "im-
portance" the case may have presented to the "dissent noters," does
not appear to the present writers. Other cases, most of which are
discussed later, in which one or more of the Justices "noted" dissent
are: James v. Washington 2 (contempt conviction for refusal to an-
swer questions before a state Un-American Activities Committee);
Wenning v. Peoples Bank " (effect of bankruptcy proceedings on
mortgage foreclosure proceedings in state court); Sacker v. United
States 4 and Hallinan v. United States "I (both involving contempt of
court by lawyers, the one in the Communist trial, the other in the
Bridges case); Kemp v. South Dakota3" (alleged conflict between
state statute and treaty) ; Simmons v. Birmingham 17 (constitutionality
of ordinance, facts not disclosed); Prudence Bonds Corp. v. Silbiger "
(allowances for attorney in corporate reorganization proceedings);
Agoston v. Pennsylvania 9 (prisoner confessed after prolonged ques-
tioning before magistrate's hearing); Hendricks v. Smith 40 (validity
of state tax in property leased from tax-exempt university); Shotkin
30. 295 U.S. 142 (1934).
31. 55 N.M. 12, 225 P.2d 1007, cert. denied, 341 U.S. 924 (1951).
32. 36 Wash.2d 882, 221 P.2d 482, cert. denied, 341 U.S. 911 (1951), Justices
Black, Douglas and Reed dissenting.
33. 153 Ohio St. 583, 92 N.E.2d. 689, cert. denied, 340 U.S. 858 (1950). Justices
Black, Douglas and Reed would hear argument on the merits, postponing further
argument on the jurisdictional issue.
34. 182 F.2d 416 (9th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 952 (1951), Justices
Black and Douglas dissenting.
35. 182 F.2d 880 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 952 (1951), Justices Black
and Douglas dissenting.
36. 44 N.W.2d 214 (S.D. 1950), appeal dismissed, 340 U.S. 923 (1951), Justice
Douglas dissenting.
37. 49 So.2d 927 (Ala. App. 1950) appeal dimnissed, 341 U.S. 945 (1951), Justices
Black and Douglas would note probable jurisdiction.
38. 180 F.2d 917 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 831 (1950), Justice Douglas
dissenting.
39. 364 Pa. 464, 72 A.2d 575, cert. denied, 340 U.S. 844 (1950), Justices Black
and Douglas dissenting.
40. 153 Ohio St. 500, 92 N.E.2d 393, cert. denied, 340 U.S. 801 (1950), Justice
Douglas dissenting.
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v. People of Colorado 41 (contempt conviction by summary procedure
for acting as counsel pro se in violation of state supreme court order) ;
Westinghouse Radio Stations v. Felix 4 (liability of radio station for
libel in political broadcast) ;. Santangelo v. Santangelo 41 (validity of
Nevada divorce and liability for alimony); Lyon v. Compton Union
High School 4 (denial to Jehovah's Witnesses of use of school build-
ings) ; Goo v. United States45 (denial of motion to withdraw plea of
guilty before sentence pronounced); RD-DR Corp. v. Smith 46 (movie
censorship); Turner v. Alten Banking, etc. Co.47 (validity of judg-
ment taken on cognovit notes after expiration of statute of limitations) ;
Dowdy v. Louisiana 48 (adequacy of court-appointed counsel in murder
trial); Brown v. North Carolina 49 (admissibility of confession while
held in custody without warrant); Marelia v. Burke 50 (habeas corpus
where relator challenged his detention incommunicado for more than
112 hours); Pennsylvania ex rel. Johnson v. Dye " (fugitive from a
Georgia chain gang); Rowland v. Chesapeake & Ohio R. Co.52 (pre-
sumably an F.E.L.A. case; a Miscellaneous Docket case which the
authors could not find).
SOME OF THE HEADLINERS
Among the relatively few cases actually decided by the Court,
there were a proportionally large number of sensational ones. The
denials, too, had an inordinately large number of cases at the headline
41. 212 P.2d 1007 (Colo. 1949), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 832 (1950), Justices Black
and Douglas dissenting.
42. 186 F.2d 1 (3d Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 909 (1951), Justice Black
dissenting.
43. 137 Conn. 404, 78 A.2d 245, cert. denied, 341 U.S. 927 (1951), Justice Black
dissenting.
- 44. 19 U.S.L. WEax 3273 (Cal. App. 1951), appeal dismissed, 341 U.S. 913
(1951). (Justices Reed and Burton would note probable jurisdiction). See also
Halvajian v. Bd. of Education of City of Inglewood, appeal dismissed, 341 U.S. 913
(1951), a companion case to which Justices Reed and Burton noted the same dissent.
45. 187 F.2d 62 (9th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 916 (1951), Justice Black
dissenting.
46. 183 F.2d 562 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 853 (1950), Justice Douglas
dissenting.
47. 181 F.2d 899 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 833 (1950), Justices Black and
Douglas dissenting.
48. 217 La. 773, 47 So.2d 496, cert. denied, 340 U.S. 856 (1950), Justices Black
and Douglas dissenting.
49. 233 N.E. 202, 63 S.E.2d 99, cert. denied, 341 U.S. 943 (1951), Justices Black
and Douglas dissenting.
50. 366 Pa. 124, 75 A.2d 593, cert. denied, 341 U.S. 911 (1951), Justices Black
and Douglas dissenting.
51. Cert. denied, 341 U.S. 911 (1951), Justice Douglas dissenting.
52. Cert. denied, 341 U.S. 923 (1951), Justice Black dissenting.
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level. What with Hiss,5" Mellish,"4 Maragon," the Dollar Line,"" the
lawyer contempt victims of Judge Medina,57 and the several objects of
the wrath of the House Un-American Activities Committee,5 8 the
inactivity of the Supreme Court gave the newspapers as well as the
law reviews a field day. 9
Of the 495 cases on the Appellate Docket which the Court
declined to review, however, only 31 were selected as of sufficient
importance to the national interest, in the authors' judgment, to merit
review. This is to be contrasted with 64 cases so classified in the 1949
term. Of the 386 cases on the Miscellaneous Docket, the authors
unearthed 6 which they listed in this category. A breakdown of the
31 cases discloses: 17 cases involving some aspect of civil liberties;
2 tax cases; 2 cases in conflict of laws; 1 each involving labor, treaties,
admiralty, statutory interpretation, criminal law and procedure,
53. Hiss v. United States, 185 F.2d 822 (2d Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S.
948 (1951).
54. Melish v. Rector, Church Wardens & Vestrymen, 301 N.Y. 679, 95 N.E2d
43, cert. denied, 340 U.S. 936 (1951).
55. Maragon v. United States, 187 F.2d 79 (D.C. Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 341
U.S. 932 (1951).
56. Although the Court twice denied, during the term, petitions for certiorari on
aspects of the bitterly fought Dollar Steamship Lines litigation, it granted certiorari
at its final session to two petitions not previously before it and, at the same time,
continued on its docket a motion for leave to file motion for reconsideration of the cases
earlier denied review. It also issued a stay order on the conviction of Secretary of
Commerce Charles Sawyer for being in civil contempt of the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia. Thus, despite indications early in the term that a review of
the merits of this controversy would not be given, the Court appears ready now to con-
sider all the litigation, undoubtedly including a certiorari petition by Secretary Sawyer,
in one bundle next term. See Land v. Dollar, 341 U.S. 737 (1951), and related cases.
57. Sacher v. United States, 182 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S.
952 (1951).
58. Fleischman v. United States, 183 F.2d 996 (D.C. Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340
U.S. 866 (1950); Morford v. United States, 184 F.2d 864 (D.C. Cir. 1950), cert.
denied, 340 U.S. 878 (1950). See United States v. Fleischmann, 393 U.S. 349 (1949).
59. In addition to several of the cases cited above, the Communist witch hunt
accounted for several other cases in which the Court denied certiorari: Potter v.
Estes, 183 F.2d 865 (5th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 920 (1951), and United
States v. Kasinowitz, 181 F.2d 632 (9th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 920 (1951),
involving the privilege against incrimination in connection with a refusal to answer
questions the answer to which might associate the witnesses with the Communist
Party; Cole v. Loew's, Inc., 185 F.2d 641 (9th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S.
954 (1951), in which the Court of Appeals reversed a judgment in favor of plaintiff
against a movie producer who had terminated a contract between them after plaintiff,
a screen writer, had been convicted of contempt of the Un-American Activities Com-
mittee.
The Court upheld the privilege against self incrimination in Blau v. United States,
340 U.S. 159 (1950), as applied to questions concerning association with the Com-
munist Party, but imposed severe limitations on it in Rogers v. United States, 340
U.S. 367 (1951), by holding that the privilege may be lost ("waived") by answering
some questions with incriminatory implications. Thus, as Justice Black pointed out
in his dissent, the witness may be caught in the dilemma of premature assertion or
waiver of the privilege. It must be timed exactly right. For a case involving con-
viction of contempt of a little Un-American Activities Committee in which certiorari
was denied, see James v. Washington, 36 Wash.2d 882, 221 P.2d 482 (1950), cert.
denied, 341 U.S. 911 (1951).
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and 5 miscellaneous cases of one sort or another involving constitu-
tional issues. In making this selection, the authors have tried to
restrict the list to what appeared to be cases of far-reaching public
interest so far as the legal issues were concerned. The mere fact that
a case attracted wide-spread public attention was not enough. Thus
the Hiss and the Maragon cases were not included. Indeed, several
cases in which one or more of the Justices noted their dissents were
excluded because the authors were not persuaded that they were "im-
portant" in the sense here intended. So too, a case in the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia which drew comment in 16
different law reviews was omitted because it was not thought to merit
review by the highest policy determining court of the nation.60
The Court's record for the term of decisions in civil rights cases
was almost if not quite matched by its denials in such cases. The
Dennis decision,61 upholding the validity of the Smith Act, is probably
the worst blow to democratic liberties in several decades. Together
with the Garner case 6 upholding the Los Angeles loyalty oath, it
has made Red hunting, as Professor Frank has pointed out, a re-
spectable national sport with the disastrous results that many who
are not Reds are caught in the net. Just why a miserable group of
political fanatics, with utterly unmarketable ideas, should close the
democratic market place to all but the most conventional ones, is the
tragic riddle of our times. But equally serious results may be appre-
hended from some of the decisions below which the Court silently let
stand as the law of the land.
Perhaps heading the list of important cases turned down by the
Court was Judge Medina's "unfinished business" 65 in which he fin-
ished off the legal careers of the five 64 lawyers who defended the
eleven Communist leaders prosecuted under the Smith Act. The cita-
tion came from the bench on the same day that the verdict was re-
turned and covered a long series of incidents which had occurred
throughout the trial, some of them months before. All together there
were forty specifications. The court of appeals, Judges Augustus Hand,
60. Argonne Co. v. Hitaffer, 183 F.2d 811 (D.C. Cir. 1950) (wife may recover
for loss of consortium), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 852 (1950).
61. Supra note 2.
62. Garner v. Board of Public Works, 341 U.S. 716 (1951).
63. In the trial of the eleven Communist leaders, Judge Medina, after the verdict
had been entered on October 14, 1949, addressed the defendants' lawyers, saying, "Now
I turn to some unfinished business." He then read a contempt certificate and sentenced
the lawyers to prison in addition to the imposition of a fine.
64. Actually, there were six contempt convictions. In addition to lawyers
Sacher, Isserman, McCabe, Gladstein and Crocket, defendant Dennis, who had acted
as counsel pro se, was sentenced.
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Jerome Frank and Charles Clark sitting, by a divided court upheld
Judge Medina's decision onthirty-seven specifications.'
The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 66 provide for summary
disposition in contempt cases, as follows: "A criminal contempt may
be punished summarily if the judge certifies that he saw or heard the
conduct constituting the contempt and that it was committed in the
actual presence of the court." The Rule further provides that "a crim-
inal contempt except as provided in sub-division (a) of this rule [quoted
above] shall be prosecuted on notice. The notice shall state the time
and place of hearing, allowing a reasonable time for the preparation
of the defense . . ." The same Rule further provides that "if the
Contempt charged involves disrespect to or criticism of a judge, that
judge is disqualified from presiding at the trial or hearing except with
the defendant's consent."
There was no question that most if not all the specifications in-
volved "disrespect to or criticisms of" Judge Medina. Indeed, so much
so that he himself occasionally behaved in a manner hardly distin-
guishable from that of the defendants. The Judge did not disqualify
himself but proceeded under Rule 42 (a) to punish the lawyers without
notice or hearing. One question raised on appeal was whether the
case was properly handled in summary manner.
In the preamble of Judge Medina's certificate of contempt he made
the following statement:
"By way of preliminary, I may say that I would have over-
looked or at most merely reprimanded counsel for conduct which
appeared to be the result of the heat of controversy or of that zeal
in the defense of a client or in one's own defense which might
understandably have caused one to overstep the bound of strict
propriety. Before the trial had progressed very far, however, I
was reluctantly forced to the conclusion that the acts and state-
ments to which I am about to refer were the result of an agree-
ment between these defendants, deliberately entered into in a cold
and calculating manner, to do and say these things for the pur-
pose of: (1) causing such delay and confusion as to make it
impossible to go on with the trial; (2) provoking incidents which
they intended would result in a mistrial; and (3) impairing my
health so that the trial could not continue.
"I find that the acts, statements and conduct of each of the
defendants, hereinafter specified, constituted a deliberate and will-
ful attack upon the administration of justice, an attempt to sabo-
tage the functioning of the federal judicial system, and misconduct
65. Suptra note 57. [Editor's note: After this article had been prepared, the Su-
preme Court, in the present term reversed itself and granted review in the Sacher case.]
66. Fmn. R. Cmm. P. 42.
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of so grave a character as to make the mere imposition of fines a
futile gesture and a wholly insufficient punishment. To maintain
the dignity of the court and to preserve order in the courtroom,
under these circumstances, was a task of the utmost difficulty.
There was, accordingly, no alteinative than to give the repeated
warnings which from time to time I gave, and to postpone the
impositions of the sentence until the close of the case. To have
done otherwise would inevitably have broken up the trial and
thus served the ends which these defendants tried so hard to
attain. As isolated quotations from or references to the transcript
can give but a partial view of the acts, statements, and conduct
above referred to, I hereby make the entire record part of these
proceedings.
"Accordingly, I adjudge the following guilty of the several
criminal contempts described below ... ,, 67
Unless one insists on cutting through the substance to the form,
it is almost impossible to disassociate the conspiracy charge from the
forty specifications. If the conspiracy, without which the judge says
he would have at most merely reprimanded the lawyers, is considered
a part of the crime, it defies imagination that the lawyers got together'
in open court and conspired in the judge's presence so that he "saw or
heard the conduct constituting contempt." Unless something like this
was done, the case is outside Rule 42(a) dealing with summary dis-
position.
Aside from construction of the Rules, grave issues of statutory
construction and even constitutional doubts were involved,6" and the
case is important, on any showing, for the bar and indeed for the
entirc nation. It not only involves the right and the extent of the
right of advocacy but the right to have an advocate. How far this
high-handed manner of dealing with criminal contempt has and will
deter lawyers from representing clients with unpopular political beliefs
is something no one can determine. There is little doubt, however, of
its tendency to do so. The guilt or innocence of these lawyers is irrele-
vant. If guilty lawyers can be dealt with in this manner, then innocent
ones can be handled in the same way, with no chance whatever to
show their lack of guilt. To justify Judge Medina's action on the
ground that the lawyers were patently contemptuous is to forget the
whole history of the slow and painful development of safe-guards for
persons accused of crime.
So far as the deterring effect of this decision goes, it is known
that these very five lawyers had the greatest difficulty in securing
67. United States v. Sacher, 182 F.2d 416, 430 (2nd Cir. 1950).
68. For a detailed analysis of these issues, see Harper and Haber, Lawyer
Troubles it Political Trials, 60 YAE LJ. 1 (1951).
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counsel on the appeal of their own case, and the group of "second
string" Communists who are under a Smith Act indictment approached
more than one hundred and fifty attorneys in New York, Washington
and New Haven in an effort to recruit satisfactory advocates. No doubt
the reluctance of lawyers to take such cases cannot be attributed entirely
to this single case, but Judge Medina's decision, the acclaim and pro-
motion which it got him and affirmance by the Court of Appeals are
not calculated to clear an atmosphere inflamed by disbarment pro-
ceedings against Sacher and others,69 American Legion vigilante com-
mittees 70 and the fulminations of the House Un-American Activities
Committee against lawyers who are on the "wrong" side in political
trials."' "For," as Max Lerner has said,7" "when fear develops in the
problem of defending the most hated men, like the Communists, it
spreads all down the line. . . . We shall present a shabby image of
democracy to the world unless we have a legal profession courageous
and public spirited enough to take the risks involved." The courts
have an obligation to keep the risks to a minimum. It is unusual
when the President of the United States shows more solicitude in such
matters than the bar and the bench.73 This case was important by
anybody's standard but the Supreme Court does not tell us why it re-
fused to review it.73a Hallinan v. United States 7' raised similar issues,
although the facts were not identical.75 There defense counsel in the
Bridges perjury prosecution got into trouble with the trial judge and
drew a contempt citation and conviction which was affirmed by the
court of appeals. Justices Black and Douglas noted their dissents from
the denial of certiorari in both the Sacher and Hallinan cases.
69. Disbarment proceedings are now pending against Sacher and Isserman in the
Federal Court for the Southern District of New York and against Isserman in the
State Court of New Jersey.
70. See George N. Craig, Ex-Commander of the American Legion, in the Ameri-
can Legion Magazine, July, 1950, p. 14, and the Chicago Sun-Times, June 21, 1950,
p. 20.
71. Committee on Un-American Activities, Report on the National Lawyers
Guild--Legal Bulwark of the Communist Party, H.R. REP. No. 3123, 81st Cong., 2d
Sess. (1950). For an answer, pointing out errors and inaccuracies, see National
Executive Board of the National Lawyers Guild, The Natiomal Guild: Legal Bulwark
of Democracy, 10 LAwvzas GuID Rxvmw 93 (1950).
72. The New York Post, Aug. 21, 1951, p. 20. See also Joughin, The Legal De-
fense of Hated Men, The Nation, June 13, 1951, p. 30.
73. In his message to the American Bar Association at its annual convention in
New York, President Truman emphasized the obligation of the bar to defend Com-
munists accused of crime. See New York Times, Sept. 19, 1951, p. 1, col. 2.
73a. See editor's note in note 65 stpra
74. 182 F.2d 880 (9th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 952 (1951).
75. The judge waited only until the following day to make his contempt finding
and sentence, and postponed execution until the termination of the trial.
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For the second straight year " the Court brushed aside an oppor-
tunity to meet squarely the growing demand that motion pictures be
granted freedom from arbitrary and inconsistent censorship.77 RD-DR
Corp. v. Smith 7 arose when Lost Boundaries, a story of current rela-
tionships between Negroes and whites, was banned in Atlanta on the
ground that it would "adversely affect the peace, morals and good
order of the City." 7' The court of appeals affirmed the censor's de-
cision, focusing its holding on the narrow issue of whether movies are
to be accorded the freedom of speech protection of the First Amend-
ment. The question was disposed of on the basis of the Supreme
Court's 37-year old decision in Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Com-
mission."0 In that case the Court had labelled the movies "business
pure and simple, originated and conducted for profit, like other spec-
tacles, not to be regarded . . . as part of the press of the country or as
organs of public opinion." 81 The decision, rendered several years
before the addition of speech to the screen, characterized movies as
mere shadows on the wall."'
The decision in the RD-DR case was consistent with the manner
in which courts have dealt with this problem ever since Mutual.' But
if the courts have felt compelled by this comparatively ancient holding,
numerous writers have almost unanimously felt more compelled by
the facts. s4  Motion pictures have clearly matured to the point where
1915 reasoning, founded on the currently insupportable spectacle doc-
trine, is off key. The conclusion that motion pictures are not media
for the expression of opinion and so need not be accorded First Amend-
ment protection sounds strangely discordant today. The motion pic-
76. In its 1949 term the Supreme Court refused to review United Artists Corp.
v. Board of Censors, 189 Tenn. 397, 225 S.W.2d 550 (1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S.
952 (1950), involving the Memphis Board's banning of Curley because "the South
does not permit Negroes in white schools nor recognize social equality between the
races even in children."
77. For a comprehensive analysis of this problem, see Note, 60 YALE L.. 696
(1951).
78. 183 F.2d 562 (5th Cir.) affirming, 89 F. Supp. 596 (N.D. Ga.), cert. denied,
340 U.S. 853 (1950).
79. The Censor Board thought the showing of inter-racial relations in the picture
might provoke disturbance. Atlanta's vague breach of peace ordinance is typical of
many throughout the country which permit the banning of films on the basis of dis-
cretionary judgments. Without more specific criteria, and without scrutiny by the
courts (which might, for example, apply the clear and present danger test) local
boards are virtually uninhibited.
80. 236 U.S. 230 (1915).
81. Id. at 244.
82. Ibid.
83. See, e.g., Fox Film Corp. v. Trumbull, 7 F.2d 715 (D. Conn. 1925); Eureka
Productions, Inc. v. Byrne, 252 App. Div. 355, 300 N.Y. Supp. 218 (3d Dept. 1937).
84. See, e.g., Comment, 49 YALE L.J. 87 (1939).
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ture can be an effective, and may be a deliberate, device for the forma-
tion of public opinion.
The doctrine to which the Supreme Court continues to give its
silent blessing was set forth ten years before the Court decided, in
Gitlow v. New York s5 that the First Amendment is a restraint on State
action. It is arguable, therefore, that Mutual should not be considered
pertinent authority that movies are not included in the Federal Bill of
Rights. By permitting state courts to adhere to the Mutual reasoning,
the Court sanctions the anomaly that the protection accorded news-
papers and books from censorship 86 must be withdrawn when the
same expression of opinion is reformed as a scenario.
The appellant in the RD-DR case limited his contentions to the
post-Mutual extension of the First Amendment by interplay with the
Fourteenth. It is difficult to understand why the Court might have
felt such a contention unworthy of a hearing. There is no reason to
fear that modernization of the law in this regard would abolish censor-
ship of movies entirely. Neither emotionalism nor obscenity should
be permitted unrestrained in movies any more than in books, magazines
or newspapers. It may be true that the picture-sound combination is
more stimulating than written matter and so demands tighter re-
straint. But whatever broad criteria may be deemed appropriate, the
censorship of movies should be subject to the constitutional limitations
applicable to freedom of speech and press. The Supreme Court, by
refusing to listen, has re-emphasized its peculiar doctrine that movies
are isolated from such protection.
The censorship evil was at least not compounded when the Court
denied certiorari in Allen B. DuMont Laboratories v. Carroll,7 a de-
cision which barred local censorship in Pennsylvania of movies broad-
cast over television. In a well-reasoned opinion Judge Biggs of the
Third Circuit held a regulation of the State Censor Board requiring
all films shown over television to be submitted for scrutiny invalid
because Congress has occupied the entire field of communication by
radio and television by the Communications Act of 1934. Judge
Biggs observed that the Act embraced all electrically transmitted sounds
and pictures and that television pictures, whether "live" or on film,
inevitably crossed state lines and were within the purview of the Act."8
85. 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
86. See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
87. 184 F.2d 153 (3d Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 929 (1951).
88. States may, of course, exercise certain types of indirect control over tele-
vision. It is interesting to note, in this context, the Court's denial of certiorari in
Cavanaugh v. Gelder, 364 Pa. 361, 72 A.2d 85 (per curiam), cert. denied, 340 U.S.
822 (1950). This was a suit to enjoin the State Liquor Control Board from enforc-
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It may be that the Court will have a third chance to review the
legal schizophrenia involved in the prevailing situation. The banning
of Pinky in Marshall, Texas, is now being challenged before the Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals and seems to represent a clear-cut case.89
Justice Douglas, who voted to grant certiorari in the RD-DR case,
may prevail upon the Court to recognize his emphatic dictum of four
years ago in United States v. Paramount Pictures, "We have no doubt
that moving pictures, like newspapers and radio, are included in the
press whose freedom is guaranteed by the First Amendment." "'
The Court's denial of certiorari in Agoston v. Pennsylvania9 '
from the Miscellaneous Docket, a case which apparently flew in the
face of the Court's own position adopted in 1949, was accompanied
by considerable sound and a little fury. The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court had upheld a murder conviction over protests that a confession
used in evidence was obtained without due process of law. The ac-
cused had been taken into custody and questioned extensively until he
signed a full confession. But not until he had confessed was he given
a hearing before a magistrate and arraigned.
The 1949 case, Turner v. Pennsylvania,92 in which the Court had
written an opinion reversing the same Pennsylvania court, was very
close on its facts to the Agoston case. Justice Frankfurter, who wrote
the majority opinion in the Turner case, felt constrained to file a
memorandum urging that the denial of Agoston's petition "carries
with it no support of the decision in [the] case nor of any of the views
in the opinion supporting it." 3 Justice Douglas, who had written a
concurring opinion in the Turner case, 4 filed a written dissent from
the denial of Agoston's petition and was joined by Justice Black. 95
ing a regulation requiring liquor licensees to obtain amusement permits as pre-
requisites to using television in bars or taverns, and to pay one-fifth the annual liquor
license fee for such permits. The State Court held that the regulation was not con-
fiscatory. The petitioner for a writ of certiorari contended that Congress had occupied
the field under the Federal Communications Act thus precluding the state from regu-
lating or supervising. The petitioners had cited as controlling the District Court's
opinion in Dumont v. Carroll, 86 F. Supp. 813 (E.D. Pa. 1949), which the Circuit
Court had not yet affirmed, but the State Supreme Court did not mention the case in
its opinion.
89. See Kupferman and O'Brien, Motioi; Picture Censorship-the Memphis
Blues, 36 CORNF1L L.Q. 273, 286 n.84.
90. 334 U.S. 131, 166 (1948).
91. 364 Pa. 464, 72 A.2d 575, cert. denied, 340 U.S. 844 (1950).
92. 338 U.S. 62 (1949).
93. 340 U.S. 844, 845 (1950).
94. See 338 U.S. 62, 66 (1949). Justices Murphy and Rutledge joined Justice
Frankfurter, while Justice Black concurred in their judgment and Justice Douglas
filed a written concurrence. Justice Jackson filed a written dissent and Justices
Vinson, Reed and Burton noted their dissent.
95. See 340 U.S. 844, 845 (1950).
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In the Turner case the accused had been arrested on suspicion and
held for five days without aid of counsel while he was interrogated by
relays of police officers until he confessed to murder. It was admitted
that arraignment was purposely delayed until the confession was ob-
tained. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed a conviction, hold-
ing that the accused's objection in the trial court to admission of the
confession as evidence was properly overruled. But the Supreme Court
reversed the conviction, holding that the use of the confession at the
trial was a violation of he due process clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court upheld Agoston's conviction
despite very similar circumstances and despite the reversal of its
Turner decision. The police, suspicious that Agoston was involved in
a disappearance, took him into custody three days after the disappear-
ance was reported. He was questioned for two hours, taken out for
dinner, taken to his home so that the police could get his automobile,
and questioned some more. The next afternoon and evening the
questioning continued until Agoston frantically accused his brother
of being responsible for the disappearance. Meanwhile the police were
accumulating evidence which seemed to indicate Agoston was involved
in foul play.9 Finally, the night of the second day, Agoston signed a
written confession of murder, after being informed of his right to
counsel and that the confession could be used against him. The next
day he was arraigned.
On the facts, it would appear that the Turner case involved a more
flagrant violation of due process than the Agoston case. But Justice
Douglas, in his dissent to denial of certiorari, was unwilling to indulge
in comparatives. Calling the cases "close on the facts," he felt "the
principle basic to the Turner decision is that the police may not be
allowed to substitute their system of inquisition or protective custody
96. The murdered man was employed by a used car dealer. Returning from a
trip, his employer found him and $1525 missing with the notation that the money had
been withdrawn to purchase a car. Since there had been negotiations with Agoston
to purchase his car at that amount, the employer called him but was told he didn't
know where the man or the money were. Witnesses were found to testify that they
had seen Agoston with the unfound employee late the night he disappeared. It was
then that Agoston was picked up. While he was being questioned, the police found
new seat covers and a new windshield had been put on his auto. Removing the seat
covers, they found a bullet hole and some blood stains. They also discovered
Agoston had paid several debts between the time of the disappearance and his arrest
with bills of the denomination which had been withdrawn. All of this evidence was
accumulated during the questioning period. Agoston explained the bullet hole at the
trial by saying he had been fishing, had found a turtle stealing his bait, had gone
to the car for his pistol and had accidentally fired it. He explained the blood stains
by saying he had cut his hand while changing a tire. And the windshield had been
broken, he said, by some young boys throwing stones.
It would appear from the record that there was enough evidence before the jury
without the confession for it to weigh the case wisely.
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for the safeguards of a hearing before a magistrate. My conviction
is that only by consistent application of that principle can we uproot
in this country the third-degree methods of the police."
When it is considered that the case denied review came from the
same court previously reversed, and that that court relied on the dis-
sent in the Supreme Court's Turner decision, it is easy to understand
that Justice Frankfurter might feel the need for speaking out. But
what he says, far from clarifying the Court's apparently inconsistent
position, merely obfuscates whatever reason there may have been for
its refusal to protect Agoston as it did Turner. Emphasizing that the
Court "has stated again and again what the denial of a petition for writ
of certiorari means and more particularly what it does not mean," 9T
Justice Frankfurter suggests "it is not merely the laity" that seems to
think such denials lend support to the opinion below.
Accepting Justice Frankfurter's comment, we have no right to
guess what the Court really thought in three other criminal cases from
the miscellaneous dockets, in which certiorari was denied over the dis-
sents of Justices Black and Douglas. But each case-one involving an
attempted burglary,98 one a rape,"9 and one a murder '---presented
issues similar to those of the Agoston case. In another case, Johnson
v. Pennsylvania,'° ' the Court reversed the Pennsylvania Supreme
97. It has been stated often that such a denial "imports no expression of opinion
on the merits of the case." United States v. Carver, 260 U.S. 482, 490; and see, e.g.,
House v. Mayo, 324 U.S. 42, 48; Sunal v. Large, 332 U.S. 174, 181.
98. Marelia v. Burke, 366 Pa. 124, 75 A.2d 593 (1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 911
(1951), was a habeas corpus proceeding by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, on
the relation of Marelia, against the state warden. The state court held that habeas
corpus was not a proper remedial substitute for a motion for a new trial or for an
appeal, and that Marelia's contention that he was held incommunicado -for 112 hours
in violation of his state and federal constitutional rights was not esablished by the
evidence. Marelia, accused of attempted burglary and of possessing burglary tools,
was not given a preliminary hearing before a magistrate until 38 hours after his ar-
rest. The state court cited the Agostonr case, supra note 91.
99. Brown v. State of North Carolina, 233 N.C. 202, 63 S.E.2d 99, cert. denied,
341 U.S. 943 (1951). Brown, convicted of raping a sixteen year old girl who worked
in a xadio shop, appealed to the Supreme Court of North Carolina from a judgment
of death by asphyxiation. He had confessed while he was under arrest and in custody
without a warrant having been issued. His argument that such a confession was
legally involuntary under the circumstances was rejected by the state court.
100. Dowdy et al. v. State of Louisiana, 217 La. 773, 47 So.2d 496, cert. denied,
340 U.S. 856 (1950) involved an appeal taken after sentencing of a father and his son,
both convicted of murdering a neighbor by dynamiting his cabin, The son was found
guilty, the father guilty without capital punishment after an eleven day trial. Early
in the trial they had been represented by private counsel, but later, when counsel
withdrew, the Court appointed four lawyers. Only one of these had had five years'
experience, and that one had been absent quite frequently during the trial. The appel-
lants argued they had been inadequately represented, but the state court held that
whether counsel were private or court appointed they had been accepted, and their
lack of experience could not later be raised in issue. The court felt the absence of
the one experienced lawyer had not been damaging. The claim that there had been
a deprivation of due process was rejected.
101. 340 U.S. 881 (1950). Johnson, Turner and one other were accused of tak-
ing part in a robbery during which the murder was committed. Johnson was held
376
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Court's decision upholding the conviction of Johnson, allegedly an
accomplice of Turner in the crime which lead to Turner v. Pennsyl-
vania, supra. Johnson had confessed before hearing, and both his con-
fession and that of Turner were used against him at trial. The Su-
preme Court granted certiorari, but reversed per curiam on the basis
of the Turner case. Justices Reed and Jackson dissented to the per
curiam reversal, stating their dislike for a reversal of a state's highest
court without a hearing.
Even if the bar cannot expect the Court to state its. reasons for
denying review in all cases, it would seem that both the bar and the
laity might reasonably expect the Court to meet the minimum demands
of consistency in setting its standards of what it will review and what
it will tolerate from courts below. The questions in this connection
raised by Justices Black and Douglas regarding the Agoston case-
questions which they emphasize by their dissents in the three similar
criminal cases-shout for an answer* which Justice Frankfurter's
memorandum does not give. When cases such as these appear to be
very close on the facts, a bland denial of certiorari seems in effect to
give inferior courts a carte blanche to disregard explicit (and in this
case recent) Supreme Court precedent. Unless the Court wishes to
give this impression, it seems mandatory that it grant review of such
cases and in an opinion, no matter how brief, either reverse in harmony
with its own precedent, affirm on the stated basis that it distinguishes
the cases involved or reverse itself. Furthermore, the Court's action
in granting certiorari in the Johnson case and reversing on the Turner
precedent merely compounds the confusion in the present situation
because there was no hearing and because it had failed to grant review
of the other, strikingly similar cases.
If, as Justice Frankfurter says, the denial of certiorari suggests
no opinion by the Supreme Court, no one has a right to assume that
the Court has made a judgment distinguishing the cases. Yet, if it
has not, what possible basis might there be for such apparently incon-
sistent handling of six cases, five in a single term? We are told not
to guess; but it is to be presumed that certain lawyers and lower courts
will be called upon to guess, and certainly, in this situation, the police
by the police for the same length of time between his arrest and the magistrate's
hearing as Turner had been. But the majority of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
held that he had been interrogated less intensely than Turner, and thus they dis-
tinguished the cases. 365 Pa- 303, 74 A.2d 144 (1950). The fact that the Supreme
Court had ordered a new trial for Turner, excluding his alleged confession, and that
Turner's confession as well as his own had been used against Johnson, undoubtedly
influenced the Supreme Court to reverse the state court. But a reversal without hear-
ing or more than a short per curiam reversal order does not cast much light on the
Court's position in all these cases.
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will find it difficult to know what they may and may not do in their
sometimes misguided zeal to preserve law and order.
The denial of certiorari in Klapprott v. United States,10 2 brought
to a disquieting climax the petitioner's ten-year struggle to get a hear-
ing on the merits of denaturalization proceedings instituted against
him as a member of the German-American Bund and a pre-war con-
tributor to pro-German literature.
Klapprott originally petitioned to set aside a default judgment
cancelling and revoking his citizenship on the ground of fraud in its
procurement. The allegation had been that he had fraudulently sworn
allegiance to the United States. The judgment had been entered
without proof of the charges, Klapprott not having been represented.
The Third Circuit affirmed a dismissal of his petition but the Supreme
Court reversed and remanded to the district court with directions to
hear evidence of the truth or falsity of the allegation in Klapprott's
petition to vacate the default judgment." 3 The district court found
that Klapprott had knowingly, voluntarily and intentionally permitted
entry of the default judgment cancelling the certificate of citizenship,
and dismissed the petition a second time. Once again, the Third Cir-
cuit affirmed, and once again review was sought, but this time denied,
by the Supreme Court.
The facts leading to Klapprott's failure to contest the denaturaliza-
tion proceeding make uncomfortable reading. It was found by the dis-
trict court that he had been critically ill, and confined to a hospital,
during the spring of 1942. Released from the hospital on March 26,
1942 and advised to live in a place where he could receive proper rest,
Klapprott went to Camp Nordland, a recreation camp operated by the
German-American Bund at Andover, New Jersey. Financially desti-
tute, he took advantage of his Bund affiliation. Eight days before an
answer was due to the denaturalization complaint, Klapprott was ar-
rested at Camp Nordland on a charge of conspiracy to violate the
Selective Service Act. He was removed to New York City and ar-
raigned under $25,000 bond. From July 2, 1942, when he was ar-
rested, until July 10, 1942, when the default judgment was entered,
the evidence indicates Klapprott was too busy to be expected to prepare
his answer. After a grilling in Newark, New Jersey, the day of his
arrest, he spent two nights in the Hudson County Jail and then was
removed to New York, chained to two other defendants in the con-
spiracy case. He was then incarcerated in the Federal Detention
House, New York City, after being arraigned. He was still in the
102. 183 F.2d 474 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 896 (1950).
103. 335 U.S. 601 (1949).
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New York jail when the default judgment was entered in Newark.
Thus a man, found as a matter of fact to have been a convalescent, was
torn from his family, shunted about and jailed in the eight-day period
before his answer was to be filed to the serious accusation of fraud in
procuring naturalization. Although Klapprott might have had an
answer prepared before his arrest, he did not.
There was evidence before the district court that Klapprott had
never intended to defend the denaturalization charge. He had little
money and claimed that he could not find a lawyer to defend him for
the $200 he had been able to scrape together. Moreover, he appeared
to have been obsessed with the idea that his pre-war pro-German
leanings and writings had so prejudiced his case that it would be
useless to defend. But the fact remained that he never got a full, un-
obstructed period in which to answer the complaint.
In his petition to the Supreme Court, Klapprott merely urged
that the complete transcript of the record and proceedings be obtained
from the Third Circuit to be reviewed to see whether a hearing on the
merits of his defense of his citizenship should not be held. After
Klapprott's long struggle and after the Supreme Court's earlier action
in the case, the denial of this request seems hard to justify.
Two decisions denying review which involved the deportation of
aliens contribute to the growing list of cases tending to strengthen the
Government's hand.
Visic v. Denver o was a habeas corpus proceeding instigated by
an alien seaman whom the Attorney General sought to deport without
a hearing on the ground that his admission would be prejudicial to
the interests of the United States. Visic had been in and out of the
country since 1925 until, in 1943, the immigration authorities detained
him at Ellis Island as an alien seaman. To avoid deportation, Visic
signed onto a merchant ship and served until honorably discharged.
Having gained preferential status through his service,. he obtained an
immigration visa and got as far as Miami before the Attorney General
caught up with him. Visic got a show cause order to which the gov-
ernment merely stated the antecedent facts, arguing vehemently that
to be more specific would be prejudicial to the United States and a
dangerous precedent. The district court entered a final order that the
proceedings against Visic should be dropped, but was reversed by the
court of appeals on the basis of United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaugh-
nessy 105 which had supervened the district court holding and had char-
acterized exclusion as a "fundamental act of sovereignty" which the
104. 180 F.2d 924 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 831 (1950).
105. 338 U.S. 537 (1950).
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courts may not review absent express authorization by law. Visic,
seeking review by the Supreme Court, did not challenge the Knauff
case directly.' He argued that an immigrant alien not an enemy of the
United States is entitled to a fair hearing and that, since Congress
cannot confer on the President or any executive office power to ,enact
laws or issue regulations which take away liberties guaranteed under
the Constitution, the regulation was illegal as applied to him. In re-
fusing to entertain these arguments, the Supreme Court permitted the
Knauff doctrine to be extended a little and, not incidentally, it denied
Visic a chance to face the charges which cost him his chance to live in
the United States.
The Court had a chance to review a rather unusual situation
in Steffner v. Savoretti10 6 Steffner, after sixteen years in this country
as a permanent resident, was deported in 1936 because he had been a
member of an organization (the Communist party) believing in the
overthrow of the government by force or violence. In 1945 he man-
aged to get back into the United States, but without permission from
the Attorney General and without a valid immigration visa. In a
subsequent re-deportation proceeding, Steffner sought to show that
the 1936 proceedings had been void ab initio because the law had been
misapplied.
Steffner's case came close to being a strong one. At the time of
his original deportation, the prevailing interpretation of the law was
a Second Circuit decision 107 that past membership in the Communist
party would support deportation. In 1939 the Supreme Court held
otherwise in Kissler v. Strecker,'"8 ruling that the statute required
present membership in such a subversive organization.
The Fifth Circuit actually refused to review Steffner's earlier
deportation, observing that many aliens must be deported more than
once and that review of earlier proceedings would over-burden ad-
ministrative agencies. The court's opinion was that a gross mis-
carriage of justice would have to be shown if review were to be
granted. But whatever the court's reasoning, Steffner-who ap-
parently could not be deported today-has been denied a chance to
defend.
The final outcome of Mastrapasqua v. Shaughnessy' 9 empha-
sized that the courts will give, if any, only a limited review of the
Attorney General's discretion in deportation cases. Mastrapasqua was
106. 183 F.2d 19 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 829 (1950).
107. Yokinen v. Conm'r, 57 F.2d 707 (2d Cir. 1933).
108. 307 U.S. 22 (1939).
109. 186 F.2d 717 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 930 (1951).
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an Italian alien who had been detained in this country when the vessel
on which he was a seaman was held in port early in the war. Given
several opportunities to leave the country voluntarily, he decided to
stay and seek citizenship. The immigration authorities instituted de-
portation proceedings, and the Board of Immigration Appeals denied
his applications, at various junctures, for each of the three types of
discretionary relief: voluntary departure, suspension of deportation,
and pre-examination. The Board felt itself bound by the Attorney
General's decision in Matter of Logomarsino,"n refusing pre-examina-
tion in similar circumstances.
Mastrapasqua finally began habeas corpus proceedings. His peti-
tion was dismissed and an appeal taken to the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit. There Judge Frank, with whom Judge A. Hand
concurred, reversed and directed the Board to use its discretion one
way or the other respecting Mastrapasqua's application."' Judge
Frank's decision was that the Board had denied relief because of its
general policy to do so toward those who were in the country as a
result of conditions arising from the war. This amounted to a policy
of refusing to consider whether or not to give discretionary relief of
pre-examination to persons coming within a fixed category. Judge
Chase, dissenting, said that the court in effect was reviewing the actual
exercise of discretion and was holding that the Board's reason was not
good enough." 2
On remand, the Board again denied Mastrapasqua's application,
holding that it would be arbitrary and capricious to grant to him what
had been denied many others, where action was taken under the Logo-
marsino ruling implementing the general policy of refusing to consider
whether or not to give discretionary relief to aliens so situated.
It would appear that the Board, in its second denial, did again
what the court had said it might not do by denying relief essentially
because Mastrapasqua was in a certain category. Nevertheless, the
Second Circuit panel, this time consisting of Judges A. Hand, Chase
and Clark, dismissed the petition per curiam, in open court and without
opinion.1 3
When the Court denied certiorari in Taylor v. Birmingham,"-4
it ducked an important issue which should have been decided. Police
110. Matter of Lagomarsino, No. A-5955999 (Feb. 8, 1946).
111. 180 F.2d 999 (2d Cir. 1950).
112. Id. at 1010.
113. For a concise discussion of this and other cases regarding the exercise of
discretion by the Attorney General in proceedings involving aliens, see Note, 60 YALE
L.J. 152 (1951).
114. 253 Ala. 369, 45 So.2d 60, cert. denied, 340 U.S. 832 (1950).
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arrested Glen Taylor, for what was subsequently charged as disorderly
conduct, when he attempted to push his way past an officer who was
blocking the Negro entrance to a southern church where the vice-
presidential candidate was to address a meeting of Negro youths. A
city ordinance made it an offense for a white person to enter by. the
Negro entrance or vice versa. The Alabama courts used the same
dodge that the Court of Appeals of Maryland used in a case 115 in which
the Supreme Court denied certiorari in the 1949 term. In that case,
police stopped an interracial tennis game in a public park and there-
after arrested several of the participants for a breach of the peace.
In the Taylor case, the police testified that they had been in-
structed to prevent white persons from entering through the Negro
entrance.11 The question is raised whether the City of Birmingham
can enforce a segregation order of this kind in this way. If the ordi-
nance is invalid, then Taylor had a right-to enter the building as he
desired, and the police had no right to stop him. If they had no such
right, he had a right to resist their efforts to block his passage. The
hollow character of the state proceedings is clear when the trial court's
statement that "it clearly appears that the police did not use force to
prevent defendant's entry to the Tabernacle" is contrasted with the
undisputed facts that the police (1) physically blocked the doorway,
(2) seized the defendant around the waist and arrested him when he
tried to enter, (3) dragged him away from the building,' (4) ordered
him into a police car, and (5) drove him off to jail.'"? The case raises
a question which the Supreme Court has never passed upon unless,
possibly, it was in Plessy v. Ferguson."8
If Taylor falls within the Plessy case, then the Court should have
overruled the latter for the reasons assigned by Justice Harlan in his
memorable dissent in that case. In fact the Taylor case presents much
the type of situation which Justice Harlan regarded as the reductio ad
absurdum of the position of the majority. "If a state," he said, "can
prescribe as a rule of civil conduct, that white and blacks shall not travel
as passengers in the same railroad coach, why may it not so regulate
the use of the streets of its cities and towns as to compel white citizens
to keep on one side of a street and black citizens to keep on the
other ?" "' Why not, indeed? The kind of segregation ordinance in-
volved in the Taylor case is but one step removed. As pointed out in
115. Winkler v. Maryland, 69 A.2d 674 (Md.), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 919 (1949).
116. Transcript of Record, p. 208, Taylor v. Birmingham, supra note 114.
117. Brief for Petitioner .on certiorari, p. 16, Taylor v. Birmingham, supra note
114.
118. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
119. Id. at 557.
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petitioner's brief, "this form of segregation is an integral part of the
pattern of discrimination against the Negro people. It is, if anything,
more pernicious-because it is, perhaps, more pervasive-than those
forms of discrimination with which the Court has had occasion to
deal. It enforces a caste system against every Negro; it brands him
with the stigma of racial inferiority, not only when he seeks education,
or attempts to vote, or is charged with crime, or acquires real estate,
but almost every day of his entire life." "0
In addition to the issue under the equal protection clause, the
exertion of state power to compel compliance with racial segregation
as a condition to the right to speak and assemble presents a question
of great public importance under the due process clause. Glen Taylor
has repeatedly made it known that he rejects the theory of racial in-
feriority which is manifested by segregation laws. When the city of
Birmingham refused to let him enter a church through the same door
that Negroes use, it sought to compel him to negate the principles
which, he profoundly believed, and acquiesce in the exact opposite of
his beliefs. Whether a state may do so under the Constitution is an
important question which should be decided."2
An Ohio case, Wenning v. Peoples Bank,' presents a situation
which suggests, on its face, one law for Wisconsin and another for
Ohio.123 It arose out of a farmer-debtor proceeding under section 75
of the Bankruptcy Act,124 instituted on October 2, 1934, the very same
day that the farmer-debtor case of Kalb v. Feurstein "2 was filed.
While the farmer-debtor proceedings were pending in the federal court,
a foreclosure decree and order of sale was rendered in the state court
of Ohio. The property was sold and the sale confirmed after the bank-
120. Brief for Petitioner on certiorari, p. 25, Taylor v. Birmingham, supra note
114.
121. In four other cases, the Court denied certiorari where the lower courts had
given relief against state discriminatory action. Birmingham v. Monk, 185 F.2d
859 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 940 (1951), involved a municipal zoning ordi-
nance which forbade Negroes from occupying property in white residential areas and
vice versa. In Byrd v. McCready, 73 A.2d 8 (Md.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 827
(1950), the Court of Appeals of Maryland held that the University of Maryland had
to admit a qualified Negro to its School of Nursing. In Atlantic Coast Line v. Chance,
186 F.2d 879 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 941 (1951), the Court of Appeals in-
validated a segregation rule of an interstate carrier, permitting a passenger to recover
damages for ejection. In Carmichael v. McKissick, 187 F.2d 949 (4th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 341 U.S. 952 (1951) the court required the University of North Carolina to
accept a Negro applicant to the Law School although the State maintained a Jim
Crow law school which, it was contended, was "substantially equal."
122. 153 Ohio St. 583, 92 N.E.2d 689, appeal dismissed, 340 U.S. 858 (1950).
123. See Davis v. Packard, 8 Peters 312, 323 (U.S. 1834).
124. 49 STAT. 943 (1935), 11 U.S.C. §203(s) was held constitutional in Wright
v. Vinton, 300 U.S. 440 (1937) after its predecessor had been held unconstitutional
in Louisvile v. Radord, 295 U.S. 555 (1935).
125. 308 U.S. 433 (1940).
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ruptcy proceedings had been dismissed. This case was a collateral
attack upon these decrees. The common pleas court held against the
petitioner. No opinion was published. The Court of Appeals of Ohio
affirmed. No opinion was published. The Supreme Court of Ohio
dismissed the appeal. No opinion was rendered. The Supreme Court
of the United States denied certiorari and dismissed an appeal. Of
course, no opinion was given. Kalb, of Wisconsin, in a similar collateral
attack regained possession of his land. Wenning of Ohio is still out of
possession of his.
In the Kalb case, Mr. Justice Black, speaking for an unanimous
Court, declared that the "language and broad policy of the Frazier-
Lemke Act conclusively demonstrate that Congress intended to, and
did deprive the Wisconsin County Court of the power and jurisdiction
to continue or maintain in any manner the foreclosure proceedings
against appellants without the consent after hearing of the bankruptcy
court in which the farmer's %petition was pending." '2 Presumably,
Justice Black and Justices Reed and Douglas thought the Act has a
similar effect on the courts of Ohio. There is no way of knowing why
their six brethren felt otherwise.
Quotations in petitioner's brief, from the unpublished opinion of
the Court of Appeals of Ohio, suggest that the decision turned on the
doctrine of res judicata: ". . . if the acts of the sheriff in the respects
mentioned had been wholly void, the action of the court in confirming
said sale was within its judisdiction and power, and was not void but
merely voidable, and subject to attack only through error proceedings
prosecuted from said judgment, and not by separate action such as
plaintiff seeks to maintain." 2' As against this position, the Court
in the Kalb case had said: "Because that state [Wisconsin] had been
deprived of all jurisdiction or power to proceed with the foreclosure,
the confirmation of the sale, the execution of the sheriff's deed, the writ
of assistance, and the ejection of appellants from their property to the
extent based upon the court's actions-were all without authority of
law." 128 Again, the Court said: "Congress manifested its intention
that the issue of jurisdiction in the foreclosing court need not be con-
tested or even raised by the distressed farmer-debtor." 129 In the face
of this interpretation, it is hard to find an argument to defend the Ohio
court's position.
It is true that the final order of the Ohio court confirming the
sale was rendered after the dismissal of the bankruptcy proceedings.
126. Id. at 440.
127. Brief for petitioner on certiorari, p. 42.
128. 308 U.S. 433, 443 (1940).
129. Id. at 444.
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But a petition for rehearing was still pending and a decision denying
this petition was not rendered for almost a month after the confirma-
tion order. Whether this slight difference between the case and the
Kalb case is sufficient to distinguish it would at least appear to be an
important, if nice, question. No doubt Wenning feels that he is a very
unfortunate man to lose his 18-year fight to save his farm. It is still
more unfortunate that the lawyers and farmers of the nation don't know
whether Kalb v. Feuerstein has been overruled or not. 3 °
Johnson v. Mathews ' reflects what has become almost a major
judicial scandal I3 for which it is impossible to find even a superficially
plausible excuse. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
held that the asylum state, in extradition proceedings, need not afford
a hearing to a petitioner for a writ of habeas corpus upon uncontro-
verted allegations that officials of the demanding state in violation of
the Fourteenth Amendment, had held petitioner in jail for ten months
without preliminary hearing, indictment or trial, during which time he
had been "the victim of cruel, barbaric and inhuman treatment, in that
he was most severely beaten, starved, denied clothing and bedding by
his jailors, thus placing his life and health in grave jeopardy."
The court of appeals recognized that its two-to-one decision was
in direct conflict with the decision of the Third Circuit Court of Ap-
peals in Johnson v. Dye. 133  The Supreme Court had reversed the Third
Circuit in the 1949 term in a one sentence per curiam opinion, citing
Ex parte Hawke,'14 on the ground that the petitioner must exhaust his
remedy in the state courts before appealing to the federal courts. But
which state courts? The courts of the demanding state or of the
asylum state? In Johnson v. Dye, the question was whether the peti-
tioner must exhaust his remedies in the asylum state. In Johnson v.
Mathews, the question was whether he must exhaust his remedies in
the demanding state. The conflict is clear and was recognized by the
130. On the merits for respondents, it should be pointed out that petitioner had
filed motions for a new trial and a rehearing in the foreclosure proceedings in the
state court but prosecuted no appeal from adverse rulings. Nor did he appeal from
the dismissal of his bankruptcy petition. He thus may be caught in the net of res
judicata of Baldwin v. American, Surety Co., 287 U.S. 156 (1932) ; Trienies v. Sun-
shine Mining Co., 308 U.S. 66 (1939) and Angel v. Bullington, 330 U.S. 183
(1947). But an arguable answer is justice Black's opinion in Kalb where he said:
"The protection of farmers was left to the farmers themselves or to the Commis-
sioners who might be laymen, and considerations as to whether the issue of jurisdic-
tion was actually contested in the County Court, or whether it could have been con-
tested, are not applicable where the plenary power of Congress over bankruptcy has
been exercised as in this Act." 308 U.S. 433, 444 (1940).
131. 86 U.S. App. D.C. 376, 182 F.2d 677, cert. denied, 340 U.S. 828 (1950).
132. See Harper and Rosenthal, Wthat the Suprene Court Did Not Do in tire
1949 Ternm--An Appraisal of Certiorari, 99 U. oF P.. L. Rrv. 293, 300 (1950).
133. 175 F.2d 250, rev'd, 338 U.S. 864 (1949).
134. 321 U.S. 114 (1944).
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majority and by the dissenting judge and, for that matter, by anyone
who took the trouble to look into the question. It was ignored by the
Supreme Court.
Aside from the question of conflict, the basic issues in these cases
are important. Under the law of extradition, as developed by the
Court, the range of issues which courts in the asylum state may examine
is narrow. They may, of course, determine whether the detaining
papers are in proper order,185 whether the petitioner was present in the
demanding state when the alleged crime was committed,"3" whether a
crime has in fact been charged by the demanding state,137 and the
identity of the petitioner as the person so charged.'3 8 But the courts
in the asylum state may not consider defenses,'39 the statute of limi-
tations,1 40 former jeopardy '141 or the constitutionality of a statute under
which the petitioner is charged in the demanding state.'4 Whether
the courts in the asylum state may consider that the petitioner has been
and presumably will continue to be deprived of his constitutional rights
to a speedy and fair trial, has not been determined and the courts of
appeals are in conflict on the question. It is clear that this is important
regardless of what the Supreme Court does or does not do about it.
In Friedman v. New York 143 the Court dismissed an appeal, thus
squandering an opportunity to review a so-called Sunday Blue Law
which seemed to discriminate unfairly against a religious minority.
The appeal arose out of a prosecution for selling un-cooked Kosher
meat on Sunday in violation of the New York Sabbath Law 144 which
prohibits that and certain other specified activities on Sunday. The
defendants, orthodox Jews, regularly observe Saturday as their holy
day, and do not trade or labor on that day. They argued that the
statute was an unconstitutional aid to the establishment of a religion
and that it had been discriminatorily administered against them and
others.
The Supreme Court dismissed.the appeal because it did not present
a "substantial" federal question. It could hardly be argued, however,
135. Compton v. Alabama, 214 U.S. 1 (1909).
136. Biddinger v. Commissioner of Police, 245 U.S. 128 (1917).
137. In rf Strauss, 197 U.S. 324 (1905).
138. Raftery ex rel. Huie Fong v. Bligh, 55 F.2d 189 (1st Cir. 1932).
139. Biddinger v. Commissioner of Police, 245 U.S. 128 (1917); Drew v. Thaw,
235 U.S. 432 (1914).
140. Pelley v. Colpoys, 122 F.2d 12, cert. denied, (for whatever that means)
314 U.S. 622 (1941).
141. In re Bloch, 87 Fed. 981 (W.D. Ark. 1898).
142. Pearce v. Texas, 155 U.S. 311 (1894).
143. 302 N.Y. 75, 96 N.E.2d 184, appeal dismissed, 341 U.S. 907 (1951).
144. N.Y. PENAL LAW c. 40, § 2147. Cf., ibid, § 2144, exception for persons ob-
serving another day than Sunday as the Sabbath.
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that the question was insubstantial if the statute could be considered
religious. The New York court held that it was not, but in fact the
statute is obviously religious in origin. There is another New York
statute, a section of which provides for one day's rest in every seven.' 45
The only different function of the Sabbath law is to specify Sunday
as the day of rest, which so clearly favors one religion over another
that it is difficult to understand a rational argument to the contrary.
The New York court justified the statute as a valid exercise of the police
power.
The validity of state "Sunday" laws has been upheld by the Su-
preme Court.'46  But the substantial conflict between "Sunday" Laws
as an exercise of the police power and a law which affects the beliefs
and practices of a substantial religious minority would seem to demand
authoritative pronouncement from the nation's highest tribunal.
New York's serious efforts to deal with the housing crisis within
New York City in an equitable manner which would tend to inhibit
inflationary pressures ended in failure when the Court denied review
of a very doubtful New York Court of Appeals decision undercutting
the state's rent control legislation. That court, in the test case,'
147
held both the Sharkey Law 114 and section 13A of the New York State
Emergency Rent Control Law 141 in violation of the supremacy clause
of the Federal Constitution, the former because it sought to override
provisions of the Federal Housing and Rent Act,' and the latter
because it deprived the landlord (plaintiff) of a right granted under
that Act.
The case arose when the plaintiff landlord was granted an increase
in his rent ceiling, pursuant to the federal law, by the Federal Housing
Expeditor, an increase purportedly barred by the New York legislation.
The local New York City (Sharkey) Law set up machinery for fixing
maximum rents in the City area within the ceilings allowed by the
Federal Law; when maximum rents were increased by the federal au-
thority, the Sharkey Law continued the former ceilings in effect sub-
ject to the right of the landlord, under locally prescribed circumstances,
to apply for an increase. Before final determination of various attacks
on the Sharkey Law in the New York Courts, the State Rent Control
145. N.Y. LAnoR LAw c. 31, § 161.
146. Hennington v. Georgia, 163 U.S. 299 (1896) ; Petit v. Minnesota, 177 U.S.
164 (1900).
147. Teeval Co. v. Stem, 301 N.Y. 346, 93 N.E.2d 884, cert. denied, 340 U.S. 876
(1950).
148. AD N. CODE OF THE CiTY OF NEw YORK § U.41-9.0 (c) (Supp. 1949).
149. N.Y. Laws 1950, c. 250 §4(1)(a).
150. 63 STAT. 21 (1949), 50 U.S.C. App. § 1894(b) (1) (1950).
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Law was enacted terminating and superseding federal control within
the state in accordance with section 204(j) of the Federal Law. Sec-
tion 13A of the State Law perpetuated the Sharkey Law for New York
City. The court of appeals' determination struck down the Sharkey
Law and held section 13A unconstitutional. 51-
With the court's decision increases in rent ceiling affecting 40,000
to 50,000 tenants in New York City became payable immediately.
Some of these increases, retroactive more than a year, amounted to
considerable sums and affected persons of small means. Accordingly,
when the Chief Judge of the Appeals Court refused a stay of execu-
tion, application was made to Mr. Justice Jackson. On August 14,
1950, Justice Jackson granted the stay in an order which recognized that
there appeared to be a "question of conflict between State and Federal
Authority which will require settlement by this Court." "'
The petition for certiorari argued that the Federal Act's general
and specific provisions for increases in maximum rents as authorized by
federal authorities were permissive only and did not create rights or
confer mandates directing payment if such were barred by state legis-
lation. It was further argued that section 13A could not involve a
question of conflict because it did not operate retroactively but became
effective only after federal relinqtishment of authority under section
204(j) of the Federal Act. The practical effect of the decision was to
outlaw rent ceilings lower than those established by federal authority.
This in effect means that the legal maximum is also to be the legal
minimum.
In light of the numbers of tenant-families affected by the decision
and of Justice Jackson's earlier concession that the questions involved
probably called for review,1 8 it is not easy to explain the Court's
failure to issue the writ. The questions are as novel as they are
important, and are such as will probably arise again whenever the fed-
eral government, in time of war, takes over functions ordinarily subject
to the exclusive control of the states.
151. The court's emphasis on Sec. 204(b) (1) and the policy of providing positive
relief for landlords in case of hardship afforded a logical basis for negating the
Sharkey Law provisions. But the narrow view of the court failed to consider the
over-all policy of the Federal Act, which was the imposition of ceilings to inhibit
inflationary pressures resulting from the emergency housing situation throughout the
nation. See Note, 51 CoL. L. Rv. 234, 236 (1951), citing 61 STAT. 196 (1947), 50
U.S.C. App. 1891(b) (1950); SE.N. REP. No. 127, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., U.S.C.
CONG. SERv. 332 (1949), "When this main policy is read into 204(b) (1), the sub-
sidiary policy of that section may be said to be, not the granting of a right to the in-
crease, but the mere removal of the federal inhibition upon the bargaining for rentals
in excess of the old ceiling by the imposition of a new ceiling."
152. Petitioner's brief, pp. 4, 5.
153. None of the Justices, including Jackson, noted his dissent to the denial of
certiorari, although some may have voted to grant the writ.
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That litigious religious organization, Jehovah's Witnesses, made
four attempts to carry their grievances to the Supreme Court during the
past term, all without avail. Their complaint in three cases was that
they were denied the use of public school buildings in which to hold
their meetings. 5' By writs of mandamus in Pennsylvania, Ohio and
California, the society sought vindication of what they regarded as their
constitutional rights. It had been refused the use of a school in Ohio
because the Board of Education rules that it was not a "responsible
organization" under an Ohio statute granting discretion in the Board
to allow the use of school buildings for religious meetings. In Penn-
sylvania, the Board was authorized to grant permission for the use
of schools for "social, recreational and other purposes" under such
rules as it might adopt. It had adopted a rule against allowing the use
of its buildings for religious or sectarian purposes. The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court held this not to be an abuse of discretion. The third
case arose in California. Tse of school buildings was limited under
a statute to "recreational, educational, political, economic, artistic or
moral activities". The Supreme Court denied certiorari in the Ohio
case and dismissed appeals in the other two. Justices Reed and Burton
would have noted probable jurisdiction in the California case. In the
fourth case, a California ad valorem tax on Jehovah literature was
challenged as an unconstitutional invasion of freedom of religion and
the press. 5 Only the California school building case could possibly be
classified as "important" in the sense that it deserved review by the
High Court.
If the Jehovah's Witnesses are litigious, what is one to think of
Bernard M. Shotkin, of Denver, Colorado? Shotkin operated a busi-
ness in Colorado, and, it appears, successfully. But he had a passion
for litigation and indulged it freely, almost invariably acting as his
own counsel. It seems that he knew enough procedure to get into court
and harass both the court and his opponent even if his knowledge of
substantive law or the merits of his causes was not such as to enable
him to prosecute them successfully. In any event, the Supreme Court
of Colorado, in exasperation, finally issued a final order: "(4) that
thenceforth Shotkin, appearing other than by counsel, shall desist
from instituting actions in Colorado state trial courts, and from pros-
154. McKnight v. Public Bd. of Education, 365 Pa. 422, 76 A.2d 207, appeal
dismissed, 341 U.S. 913 (1951); Greisiger, State of Ohio ex rel. v. Grand Rapids
Bd. of Education, 153 Ohio St. 474, cert. denied, 340 U.S. 820 (1950); Lyon v.
Compton Union High School, etc., 19 U.S.L. WEEK 3273 (1951), appeal dismissed,
341 U.S. 913 (1951).
155. Watchtower Bible and Tract Soc. v. County of Los Angeles, 181 F.2d 739
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 820 (1950).
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ecuting writs of error here; (5) that all cases pending at nisi prius, or
here, in which Shotkin is plaintiff or .plaintiff in error, and appears
pro se, and in which he does not proceed reasonably to employ counsel
to represent him, shall be subject to dismissal." 'N
That the Supreme Court of Colorado did not act capriciously
might be inferred from its recital of some of Shotkin's legal antics. The
court observed: "Bernard M. Shotkin is a business man, active, and
seemingly successful. Moreover, there is every evidence that he is
possessed of ample means with which to indulge his desire for litiga-
tion. It appears that he goes in for it 'wholesale'. He has a multitude
of cases pending in the district court of Denver, some half dozen in
the Denver county court, several here, some in the United States Dis-
trict Court for Colorado, as well as in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, and, until recently, a case in the Su-
preme Court of the United States which originated in Denver. For
the most part, he has appeared pro se. Some of the cases grew out
of previous ones in which he has been unsuccessful, and in which he
frequently includes as parties defendant, lawyers who have opposed
him in his fruitless attempt in earlier litigation, and sometimes those
judges who have found it compatible with their judgment to rule ad-
versely to him. In short, Shotkin, proceeding largely sans lawyers, and
otherwise more or less irregularly, interferes with the functioning of
all the courts within the jurisdiction of Colorado, including ours, and
materially impedes judicial progress. Much of our time in the last
several months has been taken up with the consideration of features of
writs of error obtained by him, which, for the most part, have no
semblance of merit." 157
It seems quite obvious that Shotkin had made such a judicial
nuisance of himself as to justify drastic action. And the Supreme Court
of Colorado took it. Thereafter, objecting to the imposition of a sales
tax on his business, he took steps, again pro se, to recover the taxes he
alleged were illegally imposed. For this, he was convicted by the
Supreme Court of Colorado of contempt of court. From this convic-
tion, he petitioned the Supreme Court of the United States for a writ
of certiorari.
In his petition, Shotkin asserted that he had appeared pro se in
his tax suit only after he had sought counsel from 150 attorneys, the
Denver Bar Association and the Denver Legal Aid. He thought, or
purported to think that his difficulty in obtaining counsel was to be
156. Shotkin v. Kaplan, 116 Colo. 296, 299 (1947).
157. Id. at 297.
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attributed to the opinion of the Colorado Supreme Court, quoted above.
As a matter of fact, if his allegation is true, it does not speak very well
for the lawyers of Denver, the Denver Bar Association or the Denver
Legal Aid because his tax problems appear to present a legal issue of
some merit. He objected to a sales tax imposed on wholesale trans-
actions outside the state with reference to articles never within the
state. Moreover, the trial court took the position that Shotkin's ap-
pearance in his own behalf did not violate the order of the Supreme
Court inasmuch as, although he was a nominal plaintiff, he was ac-
tually "appearing to defend against" what he claimed to be an, illegal
tax.
Regardless of the merits of his tax case or his contempt of court,
Shotkin was convicted and sentenced by the Supreme Court of Colorado
without a hearing and without argument and without counsel, not-
withstanding his request for counsel. Shotkin informed the court
that he was unable to obtain counsel and asked that counsel be ap-
pointed at a reasonable fee. It thus appears that the petitioner was, in
effect, denied counsel in a contempt proceeding in which he was con-
victed because he appeared in a lower court without counsel. It is by
no means obvious that this aspect of the case is unimportant.
The liability of radio stations for political defamation has for many
years been clouded in a fog of speculation and contradictory decision. 58
In the first place, it is not even clear whether a defamatory speech over
the air is libel or slander unless the defamatory matter is included in a
script."' The ad libbed defamation over the air is still up in the air
and it is well known that political speakers, from the President on
down, will not infrequently depart from their manuscript. Moreover,
the basis for liability of a radio station, whether strict 160 or based on
negligence '61 is in dispute. At first glance, the radio station appears
to be in much the same position as the newspaper or publishing house
as a disseminator of matter frequently composed by persons not in its
158. A few articles on these problems are: Vold, The Basis of Liability for Def-
amation by Radio, 19 MiNN. L. REv. 611 (1935); Haley, The Law on Radio Pro-
grains, 5 GEo. WAsn. L. REv. 157 (1937); Newhouse, Defamation by Radio; A New
Tort, 17 ORE. L. REv. 314 (1938) ; Donnelly, Defamation by Rtrdio; A Reconsidera-
tion, 34 IowA L. REv. 12 (1948) ; Berry and Goodrich, Political Defamation: Radio's
Dilema, 1 U. oF FLA. L. REv. 343 (1948) ; Peterson, Political Broadcasts, 9 FmX.
Comx. BAR Ass. J. 20 (1948) ; Notes, 58 YALE L.J. 787 (1949) ; 21 So. CAL. L. REv.
292 (1948).
159. RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 568, comment f; PROSsER, TORTS 796; Meyer, Radio
Defamation; Neither Fish nor Foul, 2 LAwYER AND LAw NomXs 7 (1948).
160. See Vold, op. cit. supra note 158. Sorenson v. Wood, 123 Neb. 348, 243
N.W. 82 (1932) ; Miles v. Wasmer, 172 Wash. 466, 20 P.2d 847 (1933).
161. Summit Hotel Co. v. National Broadcasting Co., 336 Pa. 182, 8 A.2d 302
(1939).
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employ but nonetheless subject to absolute liability."0 2 On the other
hand, there are significant differences between them, both as to the
opportunity for detecting defamatory matter in advance of publication
and in the public control exercised over the two enterprises. There is
a good argument that the radio station is more nearly comparable in
position to the news vendor or circulating library than to the news-
paper. No one would seriously argue that the newsboy who sells
papers should be held to a strict liability. He probably would not even
be treated as a "publisher." " In any event a library is held only on
a showing of negligence 104 and the analogy to the radio station is fairly
close.
But the public control over radio stations authorized by the Fed-
eral Communications Act "' raises special problems to some of which
nobody knows the answers, and the Supreme Court declined to throw
any light on the subject when it denied certiorari in Felix v. Westing-
house Radio Stations, Inc.' In this case, the defendant had afforded
time for political broadcasts which were made by the chairman of a
campaign committee, duly authorized by his candidates to campaign
for them. A federal district court held for the defendant 107 on the
ground that, although section 315 of the Federal Communications Act,
prohibiting the censorship of political speeches, was applicable to au-
thorized spokesmen for candidates as well as to candidates themselves,
the Act forbade censorship even of obviously defamatory material in
a political speech and hence the defendant was not guilty of fault which,
under Pennsylvania law, is a condition to the liability of a radio sta-
tion.16' The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed on the
ground that the Act did not apply to persons other than candidates
and thus did not prohibit censorship in this case.
There are at least three ambiguities in section 315 which are of the
greatest importance to broadcasters. One is whether the Act affords
an indefeasible privilege against liability for defamation under state
law on the ground that Congress intended to occupy the field, a position
162. Morrison v. Ritchie & Co., 39 Scottish L.R., 432 (1902) ; Jones v. Hulton,
2 K.B. 444 (1909), A.C. 20 (1910); Taylor v. Hearst, 107 Cal. 262, 40 Pac. 392
(1895). RESTATEMENT, TORTS §580 (1934).
163. The argument could also be made that.the radio station which leases its
facilities to an advertising agency or a political organization is no more a publisher
than are the lessors of an auditorium who lease it to a political party, all equipped
with loud speakers. It is, however, apparently too late to push the analogy.
164. Vizetelly v. Mundies Select Library, Ltd., 2 Q.B. 170 (1900); Staub v.
Van Benthuysen, 36 La. Ann. 467 (1884) RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 581 (1934).
165. 48 STAT. 1088 (1934), 47 U.S.C § 315 (1946)
166. 186 F.2d 1 (3d Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 909 (1951).
167. 89 F. Supp. 740 (E.D. Pa. 1950).
168. Summit Hotel Co. v. National Broadcasting Co., mtpra note 161.
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for which there is some authority."6 9 Another is whether the pro-
hibition against censorship is applicable to matter defamatory on its
face.170 The third is whether the prohibition applies to authorized rep-
resentatives of candidates or only to the candidates themselves.
If the Supreme Court had reviewed the case and reversed the court
of appeals on the latter point, then the case could turn on either the sec-
ond or the first. From a policy point of view, there is a good bit to
be said for the holding of the district court on the third point. The pur-
pose of section 315 is to encourage discussion of political issues for the
benefit of the public. To be sure the Act provides that "No obligation
is hereby imposed upon any licensee to allow the use of his station by
any such candidate." Nevertheless, all stations are required, as a
practical matter, to allot certain time in the public interest and political
discussion during a campaign is a common way of doing so. It is
common knowledge that a candidate cannot successfully conduct a one-
man campaign and public interest may be aroused as much through de-
bate among spokesmen for the candidates as among candidates per-
sonally.1 71 In any event, this case raised questions of federal law of
far-reaching importance to the public as well as to the radio industry.
Justice Black "noted" his dissent from the denial of certiorari.
The full significance of the Court's failure to act does not always
appear in the mere fact of denial of a writ of certiorari or the dismissal
of an appeal. An unusually vivid example of this is the background of
Shub v. Simpson,"2 an appeal from the Maryland Court of Appeals
which was dismissed per curiam on November 23rd, 1950, because the
question had become moot.
In August, 1950, Shub was nominated by the Progressive Party
for the office of governor of Maryland. In September, however, the
Secretary of State refused to certify his nomination on the ground that
he had failed to file an affidavit, as required by the Maryland Subversive
Activities Act, that he was not a subversive person as defined in the
Act.' At the same time, the Secretary of State similarly refused
to certify the certificate of Thelma Gerende, who was to run for the
United States House of Representatives. Later in the month, the Sec-
retary of State demurred to a petition in the Circuit Court of Anne
169. This appears to be the view taken by the Federal Communications Commis-
sion. In. re Port Huron B. Co., F.C.C. Doc. No. 6987, File No. B. 2-R-976 (1948).
170. The Court in Sorenson v. Wood, supra note 160, thought that it was not.
171. See Note, 24 So. CAL. L. Ray. 216, 219 (1950).
172. 75 A.2d 842 (Md.), appeal dismissed, 340 U.S. 881 (1950).
173. Md. Laws 1949, c. 86, § 15. Generally the affidavit must state that the candi-
date is not in any way engaged in an attempt to overthrow the government by force
or violence, and that he is not knowingly a member of any organization so engaged.
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Arundel County for an order to show cause why a writ of mandamus
should not be issued to compel him to accept the certificates. On Oc-
tober 9th, after a hearing, that court sustained the demurrer and
dismissed the petition.
On appeal to the Maryland Court of Appeals, argument was heard
and the judgment affirmed per curiam, two judges dissenting, against
Shub, but reversed for Gerende1 4 The Court stated that an opinion
would tereafter be filed. On October 18th, Shub appealed to the Su-
preme Court. At the same time, the state Attorney General petitioned
for a writ of certiorari to seek reversal of the judgment for Gerende.
In the ordinary course of the Court's procedure Shub's appeal
would not be considered-and was not considered-until after the
election on November 7th. For this reason, on October 19th he filed
a motion to advance and expedite the hearing. The Court, Justices
Vinson, Black and Douglas dissenting, denied this motion 175 with a
written order which stated the background of the case in some detail
and concluded, "In this situation the motion to advance and expedite
is denied." It is not clear what in "this" situation dictated the denial.
The Court also, referring to the court of appeals' promise to file a
written opinion, stated that it "obviously" deemed "an exposition of
the statute necessary." What seems more "obvious" is that the state
court, sensitive to its responsibilities, had disposed of the case by a
per curiam order for the very purpose of getting the case before the
Supreme Court in time to be heard before the election. It did not want
to delay announcing its decision until the opinion could be written.
While the Court was about it, it denied certiorari the same day in
Simpson v. Gerende.
1 7 6
The written dissent by Justices Vinson, Black and Douglas to the
order in the Shub case was particularly vigorous. They pointed out
quite correctly that the order deprived Shub of an "opportunity to have
a final decision on the grave constitutional questions which he pre-
sents." 7 They anticipated correctly that the controversy would be-
come moot, dictating a dismissal of the appeal, by dint of the election's
having been held, before it would return to the Court's attention.
174. Simpson v. Gerende, 75 A.2d 842 (Md.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 861 (1950).
175. 340 U.S. 861 (1950).
176. Gerende had argued that the affidavit requirement was an unconstitutional
extension, addition and modification of the requirements for membership in the House
of Representatives as prescribed by the Federal Constitution. The State of Maryland
contended in its petition for a writ of certiorari that it was none of these.
177. Shub contended that the Act was an unconstitutional interference with freedom
of thought and speech; that it was repugnant to the due process clause as being too
broad, vague and indefinite; that it provided, unconstitutionally, for guilt by associa-
tion; and that it was an unconstitutional bill of attainder.
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There is only a limited time for judicial review of the typical
election law. This fact has presented difficulties for the Court before,
as pointed out by the three dissenting Justices, and has meant generally
that advancement has had to be requested.17 1 "Where, as here, a
justiciable controversy and a substantial federal question co-exist," the
dissent points out, "the Court can and should advance a determination
of the case. There is no showing of a lack of diligence on Appellant's
part. Under the present circurhstances the absence of an opinion by the
Maryland Court of Appeals is no reason for refusing consideration here.
Whatever the Maryland Court may later say, Appellant has been de-
prived of his opportunity to become a candidate in the election."
Perhaps we can understand the majority's position in the Shub
situation by the Court's short per curiam opinion, on April 12th, 1951,
in Gerende v. Board of Supervisors of Elections of Baltimore City.'7
This was an appeal from a decision of the Maryland Court of Appeals
in a substantially similar situation regarding a municipal election in
Baltimore. The Supreme Court decided that neither the First nor
Fourteenth Amendment was violated by the statute, and it based its
decision on the Maryland court's opinion in Shub v. Simpson: "We
read this decision to hold . . . a candidate need only make oath
that he is not a person who is engaged 'in one way or another in the
attempt to overthrow the government by force or violence,' and that
he is not knowingly a member of an organization engaged in such an
attempt." The Supreme Court went on to say that the Maryland Attor-
ney General had advised it that he would instruct the proper authorities
to accept an affidavit in such terms as satisfying the full statutory re-
quirement. "Under these circumstances and with this understanding
the Maryland Court of Appeals is affirmed." 180 In other words, if the
legislature of Maryland can not write a loyalty oath that is constitu-
tional, the Supreme Court will write one for it.
But whether the written opinion of the Maryland court was as
significant as is implied in this or not, the fact remains that Shub lost
his place on the ballot without a hearing before the Court in his case,
and that the serious constitutional questions he raised, whether con-
sidered by the Court or not, were not decided as such by it in written
opinion. It might be argued that if the Court is going to protect such
178. Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 565 (1946) ; MacDougall v. Green, 335
U.S. 281, 285 (1947); Cook v. Fortson, Turman v. Duckworth, 329 U.S. 675, 677
(1946) ; and, where advancement has had to be requested, MacDougall v. Green,
supra; Cook v. Fortson, Turman v. Duckworth, supra South v. Peters, 339 U.S.
276 (1949).
179. 78 A.2d 660 (Md.), affirmed, 341 U.S. 56 (1951).
180. Mr. Justice Reed noted his concurrence in the result.
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.provisions as that in the Maryland Subversive Activities Act it should,
in these times, state its reasons.
GAPDEN VARIETY OF "IMPORTANT" CASES
The first judicial test of state authorized and regulated insurance
rate-making combinations, as approved in the McCarran Act,18 ' was
North Little Rock Transportation Co. v. Casualty Reciprocal Ex-
change,"' a questionable decision which the Court refused to review.
When insurance was declared interstate commerce in 1944,183 the
practice of inter-firm collaboration in insurance rate-making, for which
there are persuasive reasons, 1 4 came within the scope of the price-
fixing regulations of the Sherman Act." 5 Impressed both with the
necessity for exempting joint rate-making from the anti-trust laws
and with the importance of inhibiting private abuses, Congress chose
to delegate to the states authority to supervise the practice. The Mc-
Carran Act of 1945, accordingly, provided that the insurance business
would be subject to the Sherman Act only "to the extent that such
busineess is not regulated by State law." 186 The states quickly adopted
bills authorizing rate-making combinations and supposedly regulating
them.
187
The North Little Rock test case arose when plaintiff, a taxicab
company, sought insurance from the Aetna Surety Co., one of the de-
fendants. The premium was set by the National Bureau of Casualty
Underwriters, co-defendant, and was the same as would have been
charged by any other of the more than fifty members of that Bureau.
Plaintiff paid one premium, then brought a treble damages action under
the Sherman Act alleging that the defendants' joint rate-making was
illegal price-fixing despite the McCarran Act and the Arkansas regu-
latory statute. The district court granted the defendants' motion for
summary judgment, and the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
affirmed unanimously; all rate-making was unhampered by the Sher-
man Act simply by the existence of the state regulatory statute.
The decision deprived the plaintiff company of an opportunity to
demonstrate that there was in fact inadequate regulation of private
rate-making, as required by the McCarran Act, under the terms and
181. 59 STAT. 33 (1945), 15 U.S.C. § 1011-15 (Supp. 1946).
182. 181 F.2d 174 (8th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 823 (1950).
183. United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Association, 322 U.S. 533
(1944).
184. See Note, 60 YALE LJ. 160, 161 and n.4 (1951).
185. 26 STAT. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1 et seq. (1946).
186. 59 STAT. 33, 34 (1945), 15 U.S.C. § 1013 (Supp. 1946).
187. See Gardner, Insurance and the Anti-trust Laws, 61 HARv. L. REv. 246, 247-
9, 260-65 (1948) for thorough analysis of these bills.
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enforcement of the Arkansas statute. One writer has suggested that
there is "doubt whether the degree of supervision provided by Arkansas
meets the congressional test, since either statutory flaws or inadequate
enforcement may negative effective regulation. If, on a trial of the
issues, the plaintiff could have shown that the congressional standard
was not met, the Sherman Act would have been held applicable." 188
The decision, which seems clearly to have been one which required
scrutiny by the Supreme Court, may encourage the reappearance of
the rate-making abuses which helped bring about governmental as-
sertion of anti-trust jurisdiction.
The Federal Trade Commission's attempt to require an advertiser
of a drug to tell what it wouldn't cure as well as what it would, in an
effort to prevent misrepresentation, was shackled when the Court
denied review of Alberty v. Federal Trade Commission.:"9 Defendant
had advertised "Oxorin Tablets" as a tonic, curative of that "weary,
run-down feeling." The Commission found that the product was indeed
beneficial when lassitude resulted from an iron deficiency which it did
less often than from other causes. It ordered defendant to include
such a statement in its advertising. The Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia, by a divided court, held that the Commission
had no power to require an affirmative; derogatory statement by the
advertiser, and the decision stands.
If the Justices would listen to the radio for a few hours and hear
the endless parade of commercials and the fantastic claims made by ad-
vertisers, it might emphasize to them the importance, for the protec-
tion of the public, of what the Commission was trying to do. A subtle
form of deception is to make claims for products which are literally
true but which carry inferences and implications having little or no
relation to the truth. Here is a case where the advertised drug was
represented as beneficial for a certain type of ailment. It was true
only if the ailment resulted from one of many causes, and an infrequent
one at that. Whether the Commission has the power to require the
advertiser to emphasize the truth of his claims by spelling them out in
such detail as to avoid false implications is a question of great im-
portance to the public.' The Supreme Court did not think so or there
188. Note, 60 YALE L.J. 160, 168 (1951). The writer discusses the background
of the McCarran Act thoroughly, and the instant case in terms of that background,
concluding, "If the McCarran Act lends itself to the construction placed upon it by
the court, that statute stands in need of legislative clarification and strengthening."
Id. at 169.
189. 182 F.2d 36 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 818 (1950), commented on
in 64 Hav. L. REv. 163 (1950).
190. See American Dietads Co., 44 F.T.C. 667 (1948) for another effort in this
direction.
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was some technical reason which does not meet the' eye for refusing
to hear the case. The case also has significance from the point of view
of administrative review.
19 1
In a Second Circuit case,19 2 the admiralty jurisdiction of the United
States as well as the doctrine of unseaworthineess was extended to in-
clude recovery by a longshoreman against the shipowner when the
former was hurt as a result of the unseaworthiness of rigging supplied
by the latter. The injury took place on the dock and the accident oc-
curred before the enactment of the Navigation Act of 1948 ... which
extends admiralty jurisdiction to injuries to person or property on
land when caused by a ship in navigable waters. Previously the Court
had afforded longshoremen the same remedy against the shipowner as
seamen when injury was caused by unseaworthiness, notwithstanding
there is no contractual relationship between them.'94 Although the
Court had held that under the Jones Act,"' 5 seamen had a remedy when
injured ashore if the injury arose in the course of employment, 9" no
case had arisen in which a seaman had sought recovery for injuries
sustained ashore as a result of unseaworthiness.1
97
The extension of Admiralty jurisdiction in cases such as these is
important because, among other reasons, it raises questions of the ap-
plicability of the states' workmen's compensation acts.9 " When prob-
lems of such complexity arise, it is questionable whether the courts of
appeal should make the extension, as Judge Swan pointed out in his
dissent,199 but if they do not and the Supreme Court denies certiorari,
how will the law grow? Of course, if the court of appeals had de-
dined to take the step, the Supreme Court might have granted cer-
tiorari. But we cannot forget the frequent warnings that no such in-
ference safely can be made, so we cannot tell whether the Court, in
this case, is letting the Second Circuit do its work for it or not.
Sokol Brothers Furniture Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Reve-
nue 200 arose on a petition for review of the Tax Court's decision up-
191. See 64 HARV. L. REv. 163 (1950).
192. Netherlands Ministry of Traffic v. Strika, 185 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1950),
cert. denied, 341 U.S. 904 (1951).
193. 62 STAT. 496 (1948), 46 U.S.C. § 740 (Supp. 1951).
194. Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85 (1946), in which there was a
vigorous dissent.
195. 38 STAT. 1185 (1915), as amended, 41 STAT. 1007 (1920), 46 U.S.C. 688
(1946).
196. O'Donnell v. Great Lakes Dredge and Dock Co., 318 U.S. 36 (1943).
197. See 64 HARv. L. REv. 996 (1951).
198. See The Betsy Ross, 145 F.2d 688 (9th Cir. 1944). See also Occidental
Indemnity Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission, 124 Cal.2d 310, 149 P.2d 841 (1944).
199. See 185 F.2d 555, 562 (2d Cir. 1950).
200. 185 F.2d 222 (5th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 952 (1951).
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holding the Commissioner's determination of a deficiency in excess
profits taxes for 1944 and 1945. The Tax Court had held that in com-
putation of excess profits taxes imposed by section 710 of the Internal
Revenue Code,"0' the election by the taxpayer to compute its income
from installment sales on the accrual basis in lieu of the installment
basis 2 02 applied not only to the computation of adjusted excess profits
net income but also in the computation of corporation surtax net in-
come.
2 03
The taxpayer argued that it could compute its surtax net income
for the purposes of the so-called 80 percent limitation provided in
section 710 (a) (1) (B) of the Internal Revenue Code by the install-
ment basis is used in computing its income. Although argument was
centered on a direct holding to that effect, Basalt Rock Co. v. Commis-
sioner of Internal Revenuer ° the court in the instant case agreed that
a decision of another circuit must be given "great weight," but "after
full consideration we are unable to follow the decision. ,, 205 By
denying certiorari in this case, the Supreme Court places itself in the
position of having refused to review either of two decisions acknowl-
edged to be directly contradictory.
In Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Treganowan,2 08 the Court
refused to review a decision that death benefits received by the widow
of a New York Stock Exchange member are includible in the member's
estate as life insurance proceeds under section 811 (g) of the Internal
Revenue Code. The decision by Judge Clark (Judge L. Hand dissent-
ing in part) was reached despite the fact that the decedent had no right
to designate beneficiaries and was never required to make a contribu-
tion to the fund after his admission to the Exchange.
The importance of this case, aside from the immediate decision,
is that it passed on the phrase "incidents of ownership," occurring in
both section 811 (g) of the Internal Revenue Code and section 404(c)
of the Revenue Act of 1942, an important phrase in the administration
of tax statutes and one which has never been defined by the Supreme
Court. Judge Clark's decision gave the phrase a basic and sweeping
201. INT. Rzv. CODE § 710.
202. If eligible under the statute, the taxpayer "may elect, in its return for the
taxable year, for the purposes of the tax imposed by this subchapter, to compute, in
accordance with the regulations prescribed by the Commissioner with the approval
of the Secretary, its income from installment sales on the basis of the taxable period
for which such income is accrued, in lieu of the basis provided by section
44(a) . . ." IxT. Rxv. CODE § 736(a).
203. INT. RiEv. CODE § 710(a) (1) (A).
204. 180 F.2d 281 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 996 (1949).
205. 185 F.2d 222, 224 (5th Cir. 1950).
206. 183 F.2d 288 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 853 (1950).
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interpretation. Under the plan, new members of the Exchange paid
$15 into the fund, and thereafter were pledged to make a gift of $15
to the family of a deceased member on his death. The money collected,
up to $20,000 was passed on to the member's -family. But there was
no right to designate beneficiaries; there was no choice on the mem-
ber's part to participate or not; all members, regardless of age or
health, were included; and the member, when he sold his seat on the
exchange, lost all his privileges and duties under the plan.
Under section 811(g), "insurance" is includible only if the in-
sured either paid premiums or had incidents of ownership. Judge Hand
objected to finding an incident of ownership in the proceeds of the
gratuity fund plan, arguing that a relatively unimportant incidental
effect of the sale of something else was not the equivalent of a power
to surrender or cancel a life insurance policy. Such a right suggests
the power to give up the policy independent of anything else and to
receive a surrender value.
Judge Clark's decision necesesarily required a definition of the
word "insurance," at least by implication, and in finding the gratuity
plan to amount to insurance the court suggested a definition broader
than the common understanding of the word's meaning and probably
broader than existihg Supreme Court definitions. In this case there were
no premiums based in amount on the risk involved or on life expectancy;
there was no provision for sharing the risk on any equitable basis; there
was not (with 1,375 members of the Stock Exchange) a sufficiently
wide distribution of the risk to invoke the law of averages; and there
was not, in the usual sense, provision for risk sharing and risk distribut-
ing. In addition, there was nothing which could be called a "policy,"
though the statute calls for inclusion of amounts receivable "under
policies upon the life of the decedent."
This general construction of the term "insurance" may become
very significant in the administration of federal tax statutes, and the
application of the term to the facts actually involved directly affected
more people than the single taxpayer involved.
In Rospigliosi v. Clogher,207 the Florida Supreme Court decided
a question of considerable importance regarding the effectiveness of
stock exchange rules designed to protect investors. Review was sought
of the Florida court's affirmance of a money judgment against peti-
tioner based on a contract between the parties to share profits on invest-
ments made for the petitioner by the respondent, a registered employee
of the New York Stock Exchange. Petitioner, who at the time of the
207. 46 So.2d 170 (Fla.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 853 (1950).
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contract was living with respondent in the sfipposed relationship of
common law wife, was to supply the funds, her "husband" (who in
another part of the action got a judgment invalidating the marriage)
was to supply the experience. It was argued, and conceded by the
Florida court, that no exchange may operate without the sanction of
the Securities and Exchange Commission and that to obtain that
privilege it must submit copies of rules governing its transactions.
Among the rules must be provisions designed to protect customers
against conduct not consistent with principles of fair trade as well as
provisions declaring positively that the wilful violation of any provi.-
sion of the chapter 201 will be considered such conduct.
The New York Stock Exchange has a rule against contracts
between customers and members to share profits and petitioner argued
that the SEC regulations are transgressed whenever that rule is vio-
lated. But the Florida court held that merely because the SEC regula-
tions call for such a rule does not mean that it becomes a rule under
the statute. The regulation, to be enforced by the courts, would have
to be precisely embodied in the SEC provisions.
The decision was one of substance not previously decided by the
Supreme Court or any United States court. The question involved
the effectiveness of rules of stock exchanges as they are made by federal
law a prerequisite to registration of an exchange with the SEC. The
effectiveness of such rules, designed to protect investors, depends on
the risks involved in violating them; and this may depend in large
measure upon the applicability of the SEC regulations to their viola-
tion.
In Consumer-Farmer Milk Co-Operative, Inc. v. Commissioner of
Internal Revenue,2°' a non-stock milk distributing co-operative was
dealt a tax blow which may seriously threaten other co-operatives and
similar ventures of various kinds. Review was denied even though there
was an apparent conflict with United States v. Pickwick Electric Mem-
bership Corp.210 In the instant case, the tax court was upheld in its de-
termination of deficiences in the declared value excess profits tax and
the excess profits tax for 1943 of the New York corporation. The tax-
payer, which gives rebates to both its producer and consumer members,
claimed exemption under section 101(8) of the Internal Revenue
Code.
211
Section 101 (8) exempts from income tax "Civic leagues or or-
ganizations not organized for profit but operated exclusively for the pro-
208. 48 STAT. 881 (1934), 15 U.S.C. §78 (1946).
209. 186 F.2d 68 (2d Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 931 (1951).
210. 158 F.2d 272 (6th Cir. 1949).
211. INT. REv. CoDE § 101(8).
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motion of social welfare . ." In the Pickwick case a cooperative
membership corporation organized to provide low cost electricity in
rural communities was allowed exemption although its members re-
ceived benefits in the form of patronage refunds or reduced rates. But
in the instant case, the court ruled the other way, endorsing the Com-
missioner's argument that the distribution of patronage dividends was
a distribution of profits to members who received them. "We think
that the petitioner's self-regarding purpose, as evidenced by payments of
patronage dividends to its members, so far over-shadows its incidental
charitable and educational purposes as to make relief from taxation
unjustifiable." 21
It is possible that the two cases, as the Commissioner argued, are
distinguishable. The court in the Pickwick case had found the profit
a tentative one "so closely related to a readjustment of rates that it was
not an actual profit in the real meaning of the word over the longer
period of time." 2s But the same observation might be made regard-
ing the Milk Co-Operative, and the court rested its decision, as had the
Sixth Circuit in the Pickwick case, solely on the profit-nature of the
distributed dividends. Judge Swan was unwilling to argue that the
cases were not in conflict. Describing the Pickwick case, he says,
"Unless these differences are sufficient to distinguish it from the case
at bar we must respectfully decline to follow it."
The extent of the effect of the Second Circuit's decision on co-
operative ventures cannot be foretold accurately, but in light of the ap-
parent conflict in the Circuits it is safe to guess that such organizations
in the New England area will be burdened with federal taxes to a
greater extent than elsewhere.
Santangelo v. Santangelo 214 is important only because it points
up the half century old anomaly of our law on recognition of foreign
divorces. Plaintiff, an alien, obtained in Connecticut a divorce with
alimony and counsel fees and a lump sum judgment to reimburse her-
self for moneys spent the preceding six years for her support. The
spectacular facts out of which this controversy arose are as follows.
The defendant left his wife and his home in Italy thirty years ago
to find his fortune in America. He was moderately successful. He
also got a Reno divorce and found a second wife, in 1936. In due
course, he acquired three children by the second Mrs. Santangelo.
More than ten years after the divorce, his first wife, learning of his
financial success, came to Connecticut and prosecuted the present action.
212. 186 F.2d 68, 71 (2d Cir. 1950).
213. 158 F.2d 272, 277 (6th Cir. 1949).
214. 137 Conn. 404, 78 A.2d 245, cert. denied, 341, U.S. 927 (1951).
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The second Mrs. S now finds that she has been a bigamous wife for
sixteen years and that her three children are illegitimate. Justice
Black "noted" his dissent.
The Supreme Court could quite properly deny certiorari if it is
content to leave the law on this subject in the mess that the Court has
got it into. Santangelo had left his Connecticut home to go to Nevada
where he lived just long enough to satisfy the residence requirement.
Under the second Williams case,215 of course, the tough 210 Connecticut
court could easily find that no domicile had been acquired in Nevada
to support the decree. Considerable point was made, in argument by
counsel, of the ten-year delay on plaintiff's part. But what with the
war and one thing and another, the Connecticut court brushed off the
laches contention and bastardized, at least for the time being, three
innocent children. Nor was the court acting to protect its own citizen.
The successful plaintiff was not a resident of Connecticut although the
defendant and his second "wife" were.
This sort of thing is bound to happen, over and over again, so
long as the Court adheres to the antiquated rule of domicile as the es-
sential jurisdictional fact. In many instances there will be strong
equities on the side of an abandoned spouse and indeed, there may have.
been some in the present case. A man should not be permitted to change
wives as he changes his clothes. Financial obligations might well be
imposed although the validity of the divorce is left unquestioned. There
appears no reason, but a conceptual block, to prevent the law from re-
quiring a man to support his ex-wife even though the duty is imposed
by a decree of a different court after a divorce has been granted. Cer-
tainly the reasons are not compelling that alimony be granted at the
exact time of the divorce and by the same court. The "divisible
divorce" is no longer shocking.217
In Joseph v. Ohio,213 petitioner was convicted of subornation of
perjury. After the jury had deliberated for two hours, the trial judge
215. Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 (1945).
216. In Rice v. Rice, 134 Conn. 440, 58 A.2d 523 (1948), aff'd, 336 U.S. 674
(1950) the court invalidated a Reno divorce on the ground that the plaintiff had not
lost his Connecticut domicile although he had left the state and never returned before
he died in California. See Rheinstein, Domicile as Jurisdictional Basis for Divorce
Decrees, 23 CoNIT. B.J. 280 (1949).
217. Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 343 (1948); Esenwein v. Commonwealth ex rel.
Esenwein, 325 U.S. 279 (1944), per Justice Douglas. "The personal obligation of
the husband to support his wife, which devolves upon him at the time of the mar-
riage, can survive divorce and ofttimes does, as, for example, in those divorce actions
wherein permanent alimony is awarded. It is not a particularly novel--certainly not
an awe-inspiring step to add that the power to adjudicate the former wife's right to
permaqent alimony . . . also survives a divorce when the divorce is granted with-
out a consideration of the defendant wife's right to alimony and in an ex parte pro-
ceeding bottomed only on constructive service." Pawley v. Pawley, 46 So.2d 464,
473 (Fla. 1950).
218. 154 Ohio St. 374, 96 N.E.2d 3 (1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 935 (1951).
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accompanied the jury to a private dining room for dinner and conversed
with the jurors without the knowledge or consent of the petitioner or
his counsel. The intermediate appellate court affirmed the conviction,
remarking that the conduct of the trial judge was "unusual," indeed
"unprecedented" but, in the, absence of an affirmative showing of
prejudice to the accused, there was no reversible error. The Ohio Su-
preme Court upheld the ruling and the Supreme Court denied cer-
tiorari.
The Melish case219 raised the issue whether the principle of sep-
aration of church and state is violated by a decree of a profane court
to enforce compliance with the sacred judgment of a bishop which
dissolved the pastoral relation between a rector and one of the churches
of his diocese. The reverend Mr. Melish had been an outstanding
spokesman for leftist causes and a critic of the conduct of foreign rela-
tions of our country. For his political activities, he was relieved of
his pastorate, but both he and his congregation refused to accept the
bishop's ruling. In the courts, it was contended that the sole method
of enforcement provided by the rules and canons governing the church
is to deprive the congregation of representation to the diocesan conven-
tion until it submits to the bishop's judgment, and that intervention by
the courts of the state offends the principle of separation of church
and state. The New York Courts found otherwise. The question looks
like an important one.
In Vieni v. New York,"' petitioner had been convicted in a state
court of unlawful possession of narcotics. Federal officers had found
the drug after unlawfully searching him without a warrant. It was in-
troduced in evidence and admitted under the state rule whereas it
would clearly have been excluded in a federal court. Whether federal
law enforcement officers can evade the federal rule in this manner is
an important question. Moreover, it will be noted here that the prose-
cution's entire case depended on the unlawful discovery and seizure
of the drug. In the usual case, the evidence unlawfully obtained is
merely a supporting part of the government's case.
In McKillop v. Iowa 2 ' the accused had pleaded guilty, without
benefit of counsel, and was sentenced to prison the same day. Nine
days later, he filed notice of appeal and, while the same was pending,
filed a motion in the trial court to set aside judgment, to withdraw his
plea of guilty which he alleged he had made as a result of misrepresenta-
219. Melish v. Rector, Church Wardens and Vestrymen of the Church of the
Holy Trinity, 301 N.Y. 679, 95 N.E.2d 43 (1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 936 (1951).
220. 301 N.Y. 535, 93 N.E.2d 345, cert. denied, 340 U.S. 830 (1950).
221. 241 Iowa 988, 42 N.W.2d 381 (1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 932 (1951).
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tion and duress, and for a new trial, all of which were denied. The
Supreme Court of Iowa affirmed, finding that there was no error up
to the time of conviction and appeal, that this prevented it from con-
sidering questions concerning his constitutional rights and that, under
Iowa law, an application for a new trial could not be made after judg-
ment had been entered against him, all against the petitioner's con-
tention that he had had no attorney until he was in the penitentiary
and that the trial court had not informed him of his rights.
The question presented in Goo v. United States 222 was whether
an accused may as a matter of right, withdraw a plea of guilty at any
time before entry of judgment and sentence under the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure."' The court of appeals had held it a matter for
the trial court's discretion, finding there had been no abuse of discre-
tion in this case when permission to withdraw the plea had been denied.
Mr. Justice Black noted his dissent from the denial of certiorari.
Justices Black and Douglas thought certiorari should have been
granted in Turner v. Alton Banking and Trust Co.," 4 which involved
an action in Missouri on an Illinois judgment on a cognovit note. Pe-
titioner had argued that the warrant of attorney had expired because
the statute of limitations had run on the note. But it appeared that
the statute had not run. Petitioner also attacked the validly of a judg-
men entered, without notice, on the authority of a warrant of attorney.
The trial court and court of appeals held against her.
EXAMPLES OF How THE SUPREME COURT's TIME IS WASTED
As usual, there were scores of petitions for certiorari which no
responsible attorney of reasonable competence would file.
Vahlsing v. Harrell22 5 is an example of a case which never should
have been taken to the Supreme Court. It involved merely the con-
struction of an exchange of letters which resulted in the acquisition
by a Water District in Texas of an easement for drainage. Petitioner
had installed a pump on his own land and, through pipes running be-
neath the surface of respondent's adjoining land through which the
drainage ditch ran, brought water from the Water District. He claimed
the right to maintain the pipes under respondent's land through the
drainage easement. The court of appeals held that he had no such
right. Here was a litigation involving the purely private rights of two
adjoining landowners. Nothing of public importance under federal
222. 187 F.2d 62 (9th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 916 (1951).
223. FED. R. Cum. P. 32(d).
224. 181 F.2d 899 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 833 (1950).
225. 178 F.2d 622 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 812 (1950).
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or state law could possibly be involved. The effort to obtain Supreme
Court review was ridiculous and a waste of the Court's time as well as
petitioner's money, as his own brief clearly disclosed.
In Pawley v. Pawley,228 the Supreme Court of Florida held that
a Cuban divorce decree after constructive service on defendant wife
severed the bonds'of matrimony but did not necessarily terminate the
wife's right to support. Accordingly, the latter was entitled, in an ap-
propriate action, to litigate the adequacy of the sum of $141,304.70
which the ex-husband had paid her for the support of herself and chil..
dren over a five year period. She maintained that she couldn't live
in the style to which she was accustomed on less than $60,000 a year.
The only conceivable excuse for a petition for certiorari in this case
was the wealth of the parties.
Argonne Co. Inc. v. Hitaffer ' 7 is a good example of a case which
is extremely important in the sense that it is a revolutionary opinion
which may have great influence on the law but nevertheless one which
makes a weak claim for the high court's attention. It was an action by
a wife against her husband's employer for loss of consortium caused by
the defendant's negligence. The court of appeals, in a long and
scholarly opinion which reads more like a law review article than any-
thing else, reversed the district court's decision dismissing the com-
plaint. The case is almost without precedent and will certainly become
a landmark in the law. Save for a minor point, involving the Long-
shoremen and Harbor Workers Compensation Act, the case is private
law, pure and simple. The Supreme Court, as a public law court, has
no business dealing with such a case, even though it did come up from
the District of Columbia.
A few other examples of cases in which no petition should hav
been filed:
DuBan v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp.228 (a purely procedural mat-
ter of no merit) ; Holly Stores, Inc. v. Judie,229 (interpretation of an
utterly unambiguous term in a contract); Oro Fino Consolidated
Mines, Inc. v. United States,280 (an absurd action to recover damages
resulting from an order of the War Production Board); Lyons v.
Baker,281 (a libel action challenging a rule of law that has been settled
for a century); Wilcoxz v. Woods,8 2 (purely factual issue with conflict-
226. 46 So.2d 464 (Fla.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 866 (1950).
227. 183 F.2d 811 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 852 (1950).
228. 183 F.2d 429 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 917 (1950).
229. 179 F.2d 730 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 814 (1950).
230. 92 F. Supp. 1016 (Ct. Cf. 1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 948 (1951).
231. 180 F.2d 893 (5th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 828 (1950).
232. 181 F.2d 1012 (9th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 920 (1951).
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ing evidence); Geneva Metal Wheel Co. v. O'Donnell, (objection
by defendant that issues in a negligence case had. been left to jury) and
cf. L-don v. Carney,234 (malpractice); Texas etc. R. R. Co. v. Fletcher
L. Yarbrough,"3 5 (risk of loss of goods in transit depending on com-
pletion of delivery); El Rio Oils v. Pacific Coast Asphalt Co.,2 8
(measure of damages for breach of contract); Mobley v. Bethlehem
Supply Co.2" 7 (whether evidence supported verdict in a negligence
case); West v. Eastern Transp. Co.,2" 8 (same); Consumers Coop.
Assoc. v. Chicago, etc. R. Co.,2"' (same-with the quirk that the rail-
road here sued the truck owner)*; Reily v. Reily 40 (marital squabble
in the District of Columbia involving limited divorce and property
distribution between spouses).
CONCLUSION
As pointed out last year, the long and dreary list of denials and
dismissals constitute a highly unsatisfactory situation in the administra-
tion of justice in the nation. Of course the Court cannot be required
to review every case in which the litigant wants to go all the way.
There must be rules of limitation and the Court must be vested with
wide discretion. The petition for a writ of certiorari cannot be turned
into an appeal as of right.
But something is wrong. Proceedings in courts of justice must
be open. There is, however, little point in open and public proceedings
if important decisions are made and no reasons given. Here are cases
involving life, liberty and property. Men have been executed, others
have been sent to prison and still others deported and denaturalized,
against serious claims that their rights under the Constitution of the
United States have been infringed. The Court, without stating why,
declines to hear them. Leon Johnson, who escaped from a Georgia
prison camp shortly after his conviction has been held for eight years
in a Pennsylvania jail pending final decision' as to whether he must be
returned to serve out his life sentence. The Supreme Court refuses
to hear his case and won't even tell him what state remedies he must
exhaust first.241 Jews are prevented from selling kosher meats in New
233. 183 F.2d 733 (6th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 903 (1951).
234. 36 Wash.2d 881, 224 P.2d 634 (1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 951 (1951).
235. 226 S.W.2d 287 (Tex.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 820 (1950).
236. 95 Cal.App.2d 186, 213 P.2d 1 (1949), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 850 (1950).
237. 186 F.2d 23 (5th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 941 (1951).
238. 179 F.2d 478 (4th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 810 (1950).
239. 180 F.2d 900 (10th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 813 (1950).
240. 182 F.2d 108 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 865 (1950).
241. Johnson v. Mathews, discussed supra at note 131.
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York on Sunday," and Negro workers on dining cars complain that
their employers discriminate against them in favor of whites in carry-
ing put collective bargaining agreements.24 Lawyers go to prison
for alleged contempts committed months before they are accused and
are summarily convicted without a hearing by the very judge they are
alleged to have treated with contempt.24 At the same time, the Su-
preme Court gives a full review to a contention that a toy pig designed
to encourage Junior to eat his cereal was an invention and that a
similar device in the form of a puppy was an infringement.
245
Like the previous term,2 '46 the 1950 term disclosed the largest num-
ber of denials in "important" cases to involve civil liberties. In view
of the preferred place in our system of government enjoyed by the
Bill of Rights, it might be supposed that the Court would give the pe-
titioner the benefit of the doubt, in the determination of what is a ques-
tion of important public concern when claims are made under the
First, Fifth, Sixth, Ninth, Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments.
Actually, the opposite appears to be the case. If it is not, the bar and
the public might feel much better about it if the Court would lift the
purple curtain and give us some assurances in the form of reasons for
denial.
As to this matter of reasons for denial of certiorari, we have been
told that "practical considerations preclude . . . If the Court is to
do its work, it would not be feasible to give reasons, however brief,
for refusing to take these cases. The time that would be required is
prohibitive .. .. ,,247 The first time you hear it, this argument-sounds
convincing. But when one takes the trouble to look into the cases,
read the opinions below and the contentions in the petition and briefs
on certiorari, it becomes somewhat less persuasive.
What, then is the answer? Some modest suggestions were made
in last year's article,248 one of which seems to be worth repeating here.
Would it not be better for the Court to give its reasons briefly, when
it denies certiorari, and try to reduce its work to manageable limits
by cutting off at the courts of appeal all diversity cases and all F.E.L.A.
and bankruptcy cases except perhaps where there are conflicts in the
242. Friedman v. New York, discussed supra at note 143.
243. Hayes v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 184 F.2d 337 (9th Cir. 1950), cert.
denied, 340 U.S. 942 (1951).
244. Sacher v. United States, discussed supra at note 63.
245. Crest Specialty v. Trager, 184 F.2d 577, 340 U.S. 928 (1951).
246. See 99 U. OF PA. L. REv. 293 (1950).
247. Justice Frankfurter in Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, 338 U.S. 912,
918 (1950).
248. Harper and Rosenthal, supra note 132, at 324.
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circuits? To this might be added the suggestion that the Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia might well be made the court of last
resort for all cases involving purely municipal functions. In any
event, a good case can be made that something should be done about the
Court's certiorari jurisdiction or the way it is exercised. Again to
repeat from the 1949 article: "In 1928 (then) Professor Frankfurter
commented on the Judiciary Act of 1925: 'A change so drastic as that
wrought by the new Act in the discretionary powers of the Court must
await its vindication from actual practice.' "249 The comment was
then made that such vindication did not appear from the "actual prac-
tice" during the 1949 term.
The same comment may be made about the 1950 term.
249. Id. at 325.
